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RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE EPA’S POWER
PLANT ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVE, 2000-2011*
MICHAEL L. RUSTAD,** THOMAS H. KOENIG*** & ERICA R. FERREIRA****
Abstract
From the late 1970s to the end of the 1990s, electricity producers
modified and operated coal-fired power plants in violation of the
Environment Protection Agency’s (EPA) permitting requirements, creating
widespread air quality degradation. The EPA’s policy of lax oversight
ended in 1999 when it launched a large, coordinated enforcement effort.
The 2012 Republican presidential candidates all denounced this more
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vigilant EPA as engaging in economic terrorism through “sue and settle”
tactics that amount to backdoor regulation. This article evaluates federal
environmental enforcement, drawing upon objective data from our
empirical study of EPA permitting violation settlements for coal-fired
power plants entered into between January 1, 2000, and December 31,
2011. The data reveals that the EPA’s enforcement policy reflects a unique
jurisprudence that creatively combines both deterrence-based punishment
through appropriately levied civil penalties and restorative justice principles
in the form of mitigation projects and mandatory injunctions. Other
regulatory agencies should consider adopting restorative justice insights in
designing remedies for diffuse civil wrongs such as securities fraud,
consumer product safety, and unfair or deceptive trade practices.
Introduction
On January 25, 2012, the head of the Environmental Protection Agency’s
air enforcement division addressed an American Bar Association seminar,
reaffirming the EPA’s intent to continue to “prioritize the enforcement of
its new source review permitting program at coal-fired power plants.”1 A
defense attorney countered that the “EPA has been ‘pushing the envelope’
in several recent cases.”2 The attorney’s criticism of the EPA was mild
compared to that from the candidates for the 2012 Republican nomination
for president, all of whom called for either the elimination or significant
downsizing of the EPA.3 The American Coalition for Clean Coal
1. Jessica Coomes, Coal-Fired Plant Enforcement Initiative Remains Priority for EPA,
Official Says, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.bna.com/coalfired-power-plantn12884907470/ (reporting on webinar sponsored by the American Bar Association Section
of Environment, Energy, and Resources).
2. Id.
3. Bill Straub, Republicans Attack ‘Regulatory Reign of Terror’ by EPA, EVANSVILLE
COURIER & PRESS (Jan. 15, 2012, 11:59 PM), http://www.courierpress.com/news/2012/jan/
15/no-headline---ev_epa/. Republican presidential candidates unanimously called for either
the abolition or downsizing of the EPA:
Republican presidential candidates have viciously attacked the EPA with
Rep. Ron Paul, R-TX, calling for its elimination. Former House Speaker Newt
Gingrich promotes an overhaul to essentially disembowel the agency and Texas
Gov. Rick Perry is promoting changes—prohibiting it from regulating
greenhouse gases and various other pollutants—that would render the EPA
toothless.
Even former Utah Gov. Jon Huntsman, considered the most moderate
candidate in the field and the only contender to maintain that human activity
contributes to global warming, has promised to end the “regulatory reign of
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Electricity,4 an industry lobby, denounces the EPA’s new regulations as
“the most expensive ever imposed on coal-fueled power plants,” costing
jobs and significantly raising the price of electricity.5 The EPA is
increasingly wedged between a rock and a hard place because of the high
profile struggle between its duty to enforce the Clean Air Act (CAA) and
pushback from the powerful coal-fired plant industry, with the health of the
American public being balanced against higher electricity prices.
This rancorous debate over the EPA’s enforcement policy generates
more heat than light, featuring such inflammatory phrases from Republican
leaders as “Obama’s war on coal,”6 “backdoor regulation,”7 and “sue and

terror” at the EPA.
“If you look at the EPA’s record, it is increasingly radical,” Gingrich said
during a Jan. 8 debate in New Hampshire. “It’s increasingly imperious. It
doesn’t cooperate, it doesn’t collaborate, and it doesn’t take into account
economics.”
Id.; see also Mitt Romney, Cutting Red Tape, WAKEUPAMERICA.COM (Feb. 20, 2012),
http://news.wakeupamerica.com/Our-Experts/Additional-Contributors/Articles/Cutting-RedTape.aspx (“Bizarrely, in the face of our economic travails, the most active regulator is the
Environmental Protection Agency . . . . [which] continues to issue endless new regulations
touching on countless other forms of economic activity—regulations that drive up costs,
hinder investment, and destroy jobs.”).
4. The American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity describes itself as:
[A] partnership of the industries involved in producing electricity from coal.
Coal is an abundant and affordable energy resource that has provided nearly
half of the reliable electricity Americans depend upon each and every day over
the past decade. ACCCE supports policies that will ensure affordable, reliable,
domestically produced energy, while supporting the development and
deployment of advanced technologies to further reduce the environmental
footprint of [the] coal-fueled electricity generation—including advanced
technologies to capture and safely store CO2 gases.
AM. COAL. FOR CLEAN COAL ELEC., http://www.cleancoalusa.org/ (last visited Mar. 24,
2013).
5. President, EPA to Celebrate Job Destroying Regulations, AMERICA’S POWER (Jan. 10,
2012), http://www.americaspower.org/president-epa-celebrate-job-destroying-regulations. In
January 2012, the EPA finalized the Utility MACT (Maximum Achievable Control
Technology) rule for coal-fueled power plants. In response, President and CEO of the
American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity, Steve Miller, released the following statement:
“The EPA’s actions are not a cause for a celebration. Their heavy handed and unnecessary
assault on the American economy only serves to destroy jobs by raising the cost of energy and
possibly making electricity less reliable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. Obama’s War on Coal Claims Another 1,200 More Jobs, GOP.COM (Sept. 18, 2012),
http://www.gop.com/news/research/obamas-war-on-coal-claims-another-1200-more-jobs/;
see also Steve Igo, GOP Blames Obama’s ‘War on Coal’ for Alpha Job Cuts, KINGSPORT

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013

430

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:427

settle.”8 This article provides the first systematic empirical data regarding
the pattern of EPA settlements in its coal-fired plant permitting enforcement
initiative over the past eleven years in order to replace politicized rhetoric
with a clear understanding of the enforcement initiative. Part I introduces
the Clean Air Act’s section 112 New Source Review (NSR) permitting
program. After years of inaction, the EPA is engaged in a new millennium
initiative to address CAA permitting non-compliance by coal-fired plant
owners. Many of the EPA enforcement actions have resulted in settlements,
which are the focus of our empirical study in Part II. The second part of this
article presents findings from an original objective analysis that employs
descriptive statistics and measures of association to examine all EPA final
settlements with coal-fired plants for permitting violations in decided cases
from January 1, 2000, to December 31, 2011.
Part III argues that the EPA’s enforcement strategy employs a unique
jurisprudence that blends the dual goals of deterrence and restorative
justice. The polluter is required to pay a penalty for past wrongdoing and to
make modifications to reduce its hazardous atmospheric emissions while
simultaneously undertaking remediation projects that aim to restore the
damaged environment. Restorative justice, applied to civil wrongs, requires
companies to commit to restoring the environment to its previous state in
order to repair the community’s injury.9 Our conclusion is that applying
restorative justice to supplement deterrence-based punishment is an
unrecognized new enforcement paradigm that should be more widely
adopted by other regulatory agencies. Restorative projects to mitigate the
harm are particularly appropriate when redressing community-wide

TIMES-NEWS (Sept. 18, 2012, 10:00 PM), http://www.timesnews.net/article/9051820/gopblames-obamas-war-on-coal-for-alpha-job-cuts.
7. See House, Senate Lawmakers Highlight Concerns with EPA “Sue & Settle” Tactic
for Backdoor Regulation, CANADA FREE PRESS (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.canadafreepress.
com/index.php/article/44052.
8. See id.
9. John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or
Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1743 (1999).
Restorative justice is a process of bringing together the individuals who have
been affected by an offense and having them agree on how to repair the harm
caused by the crime. The purpose is to restore victims, restore offenders, and
restore communities in a way that all stakeholders can agree is just.
Id. “Restorative Justice has ancient roots and is described as ‘the dominant model of
criminal justice throughout most of human history for all the world’s peoples.’” 1 SARAH R.
COLE, CRAIG A. MCEWEN, NANCY H. ROGERS, JAMES R. COBEN & PETER N. THOMPSON,
MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE § 15:5 (2011).
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probabilistic injuries created by unfair or deceptive trade practices, false
advertising claims, dangerously defective products, and securities fraud
with diffuse victims.
I. Coal-Fired Plant Modifications Without Obtaining Preconstruction
Permits
From 1977 to 1999, the EPA did not initiate a single enforcement action,
even though coal-fired plants often flouted their preconstruction permitting
obligations.10 This decades-long period of lax enforcement resulted in the
release of massive amounts of air toxins that continue to harm the public
health and degrade the air we breathe.11 A recent Abt Associates study
concluded that fine particle pollution from existing coal-fired plants was
“expected to cause nearly 13,200 deaths in 2010” and to produce total
adverse impacts priced at more than $100 billion per year.12 Given the
gravity of the damage to the environment from not minimizing emissions
containing hydrogen chlorides,13 dioxins,14 mercury,15 and other highly
10. The EPA’s website does not list a single coal-fired plant CAA settlement prior to
2000. See Coal-Fired Power Plant Enforcement Initiative, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/compli
ance/resources/cases/civil/caa/coal/index.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). To update
Roscoe Pound, “The life of the” Clean Air Act “is in its enforcement.” See Roscoe Pound,
Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 619 (1908).
11. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority Clean Air Act Settlement, EPA (Apr. 14,
2011), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/tvacoal-fired.html (“EPA
issued [the Tennessee Valley Authority] an administrative compliance order (ACO) alleging
that TVA modified a number of coal-fired units at nine of TVA’s plants without first
complying with Clean Air Act (CAA) preconstruction obligations that include obtaining
preconstruction permits and installing and operating state-of-the-art pollution control
technology.” (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-92, 7501-15 (2006))).
12. Conrad Schneider & Jonathan Banks, The Toll from Coal: An Updated Assessment
of Death and Disease from America’s Dirtiest Energy Source, CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE, 4
(Sept. 2010), http://www.catf.us/resources/publications/files/The_Toll_from_Coal.pdf.
13. See Letter from Am. Acad. of Pediatrics et al. to Lisa Jackson, EPA Administrator,
3 (Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://www.lungusa.org/get-involved/advocate/advocacydocuments/epa-mercury-other-health.pdf (“Hydrogen chloride is a strong acid gas that reacts
with moisture to form hydrochloric acid. Hydrogen chloride intensely irritates the mucous
membranes of the respiratory system. At high concentrations, hydrogen chloride can cause
swelling and spasms in the throat and suffocation. In addition, inhaled hydrogen chloride can
lead to a chemical- or irritant-induced form of asthma called Reactive Airway Dysfunction
Syndrome (RADS). Both hydrogen chloride and hydrogen fluoride can irritate the eyes,
nasal passages, and lungs.” (citations omitted)).
14. See id. (“Dioxins and furans are a family of toxic chemicals that primarily arise
from the burning of fossil fuels, such as coal, and exist in the atmosphere both as a gas and
particles. As particles, they may remain airborne for more than ten days, spreading widely
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toxic substances, the failure of deterrence clearly leads to substantial
societal harm.16
The EPA has strengthened regulations governing coal-fired plants in
order to protect the public health from excessive, preventable air toxins.17
Coal-fired plants plainly externalize health care costs, even when nominally
complying with federal air permitting requirements. America’s coal-fired
electricity producing facilities create over “386,000 tons of 84 separate
hazardous air pollutants from over 440 plants in 46 states” every year.18 The
specified regulated harmful chemicals, compounds, or groups of
compounds emitted from power plants, listed in CAA section 112(b),
include the acid gases: hydrogen chloride (HCl) and hydrogen fluoride
(HF).19 Hazardous air pollutant (HAP) metals emitted from coal-fired plants
include arsenic (As), cadmium (Cd) and lead (Pb) compounds.20 Organic
HAPs include deadly dioxins,21 which are considered highly toxic
from their source, and depositing in water and soil. Dioxins have been found in the U.S. food
supply; in 2002-2003, the U.S. Department of Agriculture found dioxin-like substances in
meat and poultry. Researchers have found dioxins in the breast milk of nursing mothers.”
(citations omitted)).
15. See id. at 5 (“Once released to the atmosphere, mercury returns to the earth in rain
or snowfall, and pollutes waterways and the wildlife in them[.] . . . Eating foods containing
methylmercury can expose the brains of adults, children and developing fetus[es] to harm.
Critical periods are during pregnancy and in the early months after children are born.
Mercury exposure can lead to developmental birth defects and interfere with neurological
development. Pregnant women who consume fish and shellfish can transmit that
methylmercury to their developing fetuses, and infants can ingest methylmercury in breast
milk.” (citations omitted)).
16. See id. (“Non-mercury metals and metal-like substances (e.g. arsenic and selenium)
comprise a significant part of fine particulate matter (PM2.5) emitted from coal-fired power
plants. These primary particles come in addition to the secondary particles formed as a result
of chemical reactions in sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions. Those secondary
particles, notably sulfates and nitrates, pose similar life-threatening risks.”).
17. EPA Issues First National Standards for Mercury Pollution from Power Plants/
Historic ‘Mercury and Air Toxics Standards’ Meet 20-Year Old Requirement to Cut
Dangerous Smokestack Emissions, EPA (Dec. 21, 2011), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/
admpress.nsf/d0cf6618525a9efb85257359003fb69d/bd8b3f37edf5716d8525796d005dd086!
opendocument (“EPA estimates that the new safeguards will prevent as many as 11,000
premature deaths and 4,700 heart attacks a year. The standards will also help America’s
children grow up healthier—preventing 130,000 cases of childhood asthma symptoms and
about 6,300 fewer cases of acute bronchitis among children each year.”).
18. See Letter from Am. Acad. of Pediatrics et al. to Lisa Jackson, EPA Administrator,
supra note 13, at 2.
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (2006).
20. See id.
21. See id.
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carcinogens.22 Benzene and methyl hydrazine are also HAPs listed in
section 112(b).23 Radionuclides emitted by power plants raise the life-time
probability of serious health issues.24
Coal-fired “[power] plants are also the most significant industrial
contributors to the nation’s mercury pollution, which causes serious health
effects in humans and wildlife.”25 “Mercury is a developmental neurotoxin
22. Dioxins and Furans, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, http://www.chem.unep.
ch/gpa_trial/1_10dio.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2013) (“The overall toxicity of a dioxin
containing mixture is assumed to be the Toxic Equivalent (TEQ) of a stated amount of pure
2, 3, 7, 8-tetrachloro-dibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD), the most potent, hazardous and well-studied
dioxin.”).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1).
24. DEV., SEC., & COOPERATION POLICY & GLOBAL AFFAIRS NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL
ET AL., URBANIZATION, ENERGY, AND AIR POLLUTION IN CHINA: THE CHALLENGES AHEAD
184 (2004); see also Coal-Fired Power Plant Emissions, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/radtown/
coal-plant.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013) (“Coal contains trace quantities of the naturallyoccurring radionuclides uranium and thorium, as well as their radioactive decay products,
and potassium-40. When coal is burned, minerals, including most of the radionuclides, do
not burn and concentrate in the ash.”); THE BIOSPHERE: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE MIAMI INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE BIOSPHERE 122 (T. Nejat
Veziroğlu ed., 1984) (symposium held April 23-24, 1984, at Miami Beach, Fla.) (explaining
overall health risks of radionuclides).
25. Nicholas Morales, Case Comment, New Jersey v. Environment Protection Agency,
33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 263, 264 (2009).
Electric utility steam generating units (“EGUs” or “power plants”) fueled by
coal produce over half of the United States’s [sic] electricity. However, they
also emit over 150,000 tons of hazardous air pollutants annually, and, in
contributing over forty percent of U.S. anthropogenic mercury emissions, they
constitute the single largest source of such emissions. Mercury is an extremely
dangerous neurotoxin that can cause neurological damage in developing fetuses
and infants, cardiac abnormalities in children, and cardiovascular problems in
adults. Mercury emitted into the air as a byproduct of electricity generation
eventually settles on land and in water, where it bioaccumulates in the fatty
tissue of fish. Humans and wildlife become exposed to mercury when they
consume fish in which mercury has accumulated.
Id. at 264 (footnotes omitted); see also NESCAUM, Mercury MACT Under the Clean Air
Act: An Assessment of the Mercury Emissions Outcomes of Stakeholder Group
Recommendations, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON ENV’T & PUB. WORKS (May 8, 2003), http://epw.
senate.gov/108th/Jeffords_050803_3.htm.
In 1998, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) identified mercury
as the hazardous air pollutant of “greatest potential concern” associated with
coal-fired electricity production. Moreover, coal-fired power plants were
identified as the largest remaining source of airborne mercury emissions in the
U.S. following the regulation of other important mercury sources, such as
municipal and medical waste incinerators, in the late 1990s.
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that is” particularly hazardous to developing fetuses and young children.26
Nitrogen oxides, when combined with volatile organic chemicals, produce
long-term lung damage, particularly in children.27 Sulfur dioxide and
nitrogen oxides are converted into fine particulate matter once they become
airborne.28 These tiny particles are particularly hazardous to children and
those with respiration problems because they “can be breathed in and
lodged deep in the lungs, leading to a variety of health problems and even
premature death,” primarily from lung cancer and cardiac damage.29 The
harms from this preventable air pollution are widely distributed throughout
American society.
In the twenty-first century, the EPA’s enforcement of permitting laws
has shifted sharply away from neglect and toward proactive vigilance. On
November 3, 1999, the EPA commenced “one of the largest enforcement
investigations in EPA history.”30 The EPA’s post-1999 coordinated
campaign targets utilities that modified their plants “without [incorporating]
the best available emissions-control technology, [thereby] increasing air
pollution near the facilities and far downwind of the plants, along the
Eastern Seaboard.”31 The EPA prosecutors found that “[power] plants
illegally released massive amounts of air pollutants over a period of several
years and contributed [to] some of the most severe environmental problems
facing the United States today.”32
Id. (footnote omitted).
26. Keith Harley, Mercurial but Not Swift—U.S. EPA’s Initiative to Regulate Coal
Plant Mercury Emissions Changes Course Again As It Enters a Third Decade, 86 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 277, 278-79 (2011).
27. See EPA, NOx: How Nitrogen Oxides Affect the Way We Live and Breathe, NAT’L
CTR. FOR HEALTHY HOUS., 3 (Sept. 1998), http://www.nchh.org/Portals/0/contents/EPA_
Nitrogen_oxides.pdf.
28. See Northern Indiana Public Service Company Clean Air Act Settlement, EPA (Jan.
13, 2011), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/nipsco.html (“High
concentrations of SO2 affect breathing and may aggravate existing respiratory and
cardiovascular disease. Sensitive populations include asthmatics, individuals with bronchitis
or emphysema, children and the elderly. Sulfur dioxide is also a primary contributor to acid
deposition, or acid rain.”).
29. Id.
30. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Sues Electric Utilities in Unprecedented
Action to Enforce the Clean Air Act (Nov. 3, 1999), available at http://www.justice.
gov/opa/pr/1999/November/524enr.htm (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. Id.
32. Coal-Fired Power Plant Enforcement Initiative, supra note 10 (describing
deleterious public health impact caused by power plant’s failure to meet their New Source
Review permitting requirements).
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A. The EPA’s Permitting Requirements for Coal Fired Plants
1. The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments & Permitting Violations
The Clean Air Act is considered one of the murkiest federal statutes
because of its stunning complexity and convoluted history of
amendments.33 Under the 1970 CAA amendments, Congress added “new
source performance standards” (NSPS) authorizing the EPA Administrator
to apply these standards to stationary sources such as coal-fired plants.34
New sources include any “modification of which is commenced after the
publication of regulations (or, if earlier, proposed regulations) prescribing a
standard of performance under this section which will be applicable to such
source.”35
The 1974 CAA regulations expressly clarified that existing coal-fired
plants were subject to EPA regulations if the plants made any major
modifications to their facilities.36 The CAA created new “requirements for
preconstruction permits for new and modified major stationary sources,”
known as the “new source review (NSR) program.”37 The NSR program
consists of two standards for review: Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) for regions that have attained air quality standards and
Non-attainment New Source Review (NNSR) for regions that have not
attained air quality standards.38 The EPA’s PSD program was
“implemented through preconstruction reviews of new or modified sources
of sulfur dioxide and particulate matter.”39 The NSR rules were open to
33. See 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 3.1A(A)
(2012) (“The Act consumes 313 pages in the Statutes at Large, nearly 10 times the length of
the original Clean Air Act of 1970 . . . .”). See generally The Clean Air Act: What You Need
to Know, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Apr. 30, 2004), http://www.foley.com/publications/
pub_detail.aspx?pubid=2070 (describing the statute’s myriad provisions).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 7211(b)(1)(A), (j)(1)(A)(iv) (1994) (repealed 1996).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2) (2006).
36. The EPA Administrator released final regulations in December 1974 “amending
each state plan to include a [Prevention of Significant Deterioration] PSD requirement. The
new PSD program implemented through preconstruction reviews of new or modified sources
of sulfur dioxide and particulate matter.” Ala. Power v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 347 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (footnote omitted).
37. ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR., AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: COMPLIANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT 177 (2001).
38. National Enforcement Initiatives for Fiscal Years 2008 - 2010: Clean Air Act: New
Source Review/Prevention of Significant Deterioration, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/
data/planning/priorities/caansrpsd.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
39. Costle, 636 F.2d at 347 (defining significant deterioration “in terms of allowable
numerical increases in the concentration of sulfur dioxide and particulate matter in areas
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interpretation as to what constituted a major modification, rather than an
alteration made as part of a process of routine maintenance.40 The energy
industry seized upon this definitional indeterminacy as a defense against
any EPA enforcement action.41

where ambient pollution levels were presumed by the regulations to be lower than those
mandated by primary and secondary NAAQS”); see also Third Amended Intervenor
Complaint ¶ 47, United States v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., No. C2-99-1182 (S.D. Ohio
filed Sept. 17, 2004) (“Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7409, the Administrator of the [EPA] has
promulgated regulations establishing primary and secondary national ambient air quality
standards (‘NAAQS’ or ‘ambient air quality standards’) for certain criteria air pollutants,
including ozone and SO2. The primary NAAQS are to be adequate to protect the public
health, and the secondary NAAQS are to be adequate to protect the public welfare, from any
known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of the air pollutant in the
ambient air.”).
40. JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30853, CLEAN AIR ACT: A
SUMMARY OF THE ACT AND ITS MAJOR REQUIREMENTS 12, http://www.fpc.state.gov/
documents/organization/47810.pdf (last updated May 9, 2005) (“The standards also apply to
modifications of existing facilities, through a process called New Source Review (NSR). The
law’s ambiguity regarding what constitutes a modification (subject to NSR) as opposed to
routine maintenance of a facility has led to litigation, with EPA recently proposing to modify
its interpretation of the requirements of this section.”).
41. Congress compounded the difficulty by creating uncertainty as to the meaning of
new and modified sources. The D.C. Circuit noted how Congress failed to even refer to
modifications beyond the NNSR portion of the CAA amendments:
Due to a technical defect, however, Congress initially achieved this goal only in
the NNSR portion of the amendments, which defined modification by reference
to the NSPS definition: “The terms ‘modifications’ and ‘modified’ mean the
same as the term ‘modification’ as used in section 7411(a)(4) of this title.” By
contrast, the PSD portion of the amendments applied initially to new sources
only. Congress corrected this in a technical amendment passed several months
later, which applied the PSD program to sources that were to undergo
modifications “as defined in section 7411(a) of this title.”
New York v. U.S. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citation omitted). The
CAA amendments’ murkiness reduced the ability of the EPA to enforce the rules.
EPA’s bargaining power was no doubt substantially reduced by the Agency’s
determination to eliminate the Clean Air Act New Source Review revisions that
its own staff was trying to enforce. Industry lawyers correctly calculated that
the resulting confusion—in the courts, as well as at EPA—opened the door to
endless litigation that, at worst, would allow their clients to postpone cleanup
and minimize penalties. Cases that might have settled years ago are still in
court. For example, the Justice Department announced in December of 2000
that the Cinergy Corporation had agreed to settle NSR violations, and would
spend $1.4 billion to clean up its power plants and pay an $8.5 million fine.
That agreement was shelved in 2001, after EPA announced proposed rule
changes, and the case has been in litigation for nearly seven years.
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2. Defining a Major Modification That Triggers a CAA Permitting
Obligation
Prior to its twenty-first century enforcement efforts, the EPA was widely
criticized for overly lax oversight of pollution sources.42 Historically, the
EPA had a de facto policy of letting “serious violators walk away with the
equivalent of a slap on the wrist.”43 The EPA’s passivity allowed
“widespread noncompliance” with permitting requirements, which seem
less ambiguous than the utilities have claimed.44 A major modification45 is
Eric V. Schaeffer, Paying Less to Pollute: Environmental Enforcement under the Bush
Administration, A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY: CLEAN AIR: LAW, POLICY, & PRACTICE
(Nov. 2007) (footnote omitted).
42. See EPA Must Improve Oversight of State Enforcement, EPA (Dec. 9, 2011),
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2012/20111209-12-P-0113.pdf (“EPA does not consistently
hold states accountable for meeting enforcement standards, has not set clear and consistent
national benchmarks, and does not act effectively to curtail weak and inconsistent
enforcement by states.”). During the formative period of the EPA, the agency was reluctant
to impose substantial penalties on violators, as in the following example:
[A] small firm emitting dangerous levels of lead pollution succeeded in evading
detection for nine years through the simple expedient of failing to apply for an
emissions permit, and, after its chance detection, continued to pollute under the
threat of a $25,000 per day fine until reaching a negotiated settlement costing a
tiny fraction of its maximum possible fine of $25,000,000.
Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93
YALE L.J. 857, 882-83 n.74 (1984).
43. David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a “Reinvented”
State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1, 3 (2000); see also Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory
Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental
Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 879 (1985) (arguing that federal enforcement is feeble).
44. Markell, supra note 43, at 56. In 1999, the EPA “dramatically step[ped] up its
enforcement of new source review, contending that past repairs at many coal-fired power
plants triggered new source permitting standards.” David B. Spence, Coal-Fired Power in a
Restructured Electricity Market, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 187, 205 (2005) (explaining
how the EPA stepped up enforcement against coal-fired plants after a long hiatus of nonenforcement).
The last decade has seen a series of fierce, protracted battles over the
regulation of air pollution from coal-fired power plants in the United States.
These battles have been (and are being) waged by electric utilities,
environmental groups, and the last two presidential administrations, among
others, before courts, agencies and Congress.
Id. at 187.
45. “New Source Review” covers both new coal-fired plant contraction and
modifications of “major” sources. The EPA has promulgated regulations to implement the
NSR program permitting requirements that apply to “major modifications.” 40 C.F.R. §§
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the predicate for a NSR permit under the CAA,46 creating the duty to install
pollution controls that minimize air toxins.47
The CAA’s 1970 amendments require new or modified (or improved)
major stationary sources of air pollution to comply with its NSR program.48
The CAA defines “modification” to mean any change to a stationary source
that “increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source” or
leads to the emission of any new pollutant.49 A coal plant is a “stationary
source” in that it is a “building, structure, facility, or installation which
emits or may emit any air pollutant.”50 The 1977 amendments drew upon
this preexisting definition stating, “[A] source undertakes a modification
when ‘any physical change . . . or change in the method of operation . . .
which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source’
occurs.”51 A “major modification” occurs if a project significantly increases
total annual emissions at the overall source, calculated using representative
51.166(i), 52.21(i) (2012). A “major modification” occurs if the project significantly
increases total annual emissions at the overall source, calculated using representative hours
of operation. 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(2)-(3), (21).
46. New York v. U.S. EPA, 413 F.3d at 10 (“Among other things, these amendments
directed that major stationary sources undertaking modifications must obtain preconstruction
permits, as must major new sources, through a process known as ‘New Source Review’
(‘NSR’) According to a preexisting definition referenced in the 1977 amendments, a source
undertakes a modification when ‘any physical change . . . or change in the method of
operation . . . which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source’
occurs” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) (2000)) (alterations in original)); see also United
States v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d 539, 543 (4th Cir. 2005).
47. 40 C.F.R. §§ 7475(a)(1), 7479(2)(c), 7503(a).
48. Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, New Source Review: An Analysis of
the Consistency of Enforcement Actions with the Clean Air Act and Implementing
Regulations, at i (Jan. 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/
civil/caa/doj-nsrreport.pdf. The CAA Amendments of 1970 state:
The term “major source” means any stationary source or group of stationary
sources located within a contiguous area and under common control that emits
or has the potential to emit considering controls, in the aggregate, 10 tons per
year or more of any hazardous air pollutant or 25 tons per year or more of any
combination of hazardous air pollutants. The Administrator may establish a
lesser quantity, or in the case of radionuclides different criteria, for a major
source than that specified in the previous sentence, on the basis of the potency
of the air pollutant, persistence, potential for bioaccumulation, other
characteristics of the air pollutant, or other relevant factors.
42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4).
50. Id. § 7411(a)(3).
51. New York v. U.S. EPA, 413 F.3d at 10 (alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
7411(a)(4) (2000)).
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hours of operation.52 New coal-fired plants are not permitted to commence
construction if their emissions would cause or contribute to air quality
degradation.53
The 1977 amendments required PSD review of “19 major sources which
emit, or have the potential to emit, 100 tons per year or more of any
pollutant.”54 The PSD also applied to other sources “having the potential to
emit 250 tons per year or more of any pollutant.”55 The CAA exempted
extant electricity generating units (EGUs) such as coal-fired plants from its
permitting requirements.56

52. 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(2)-(3), (21) (2012) (defining contours of a major
modification).
53. National Enforcement Initiatives for Fiscal Years 2008 - 2010: Clean Air Act: New
Source Review/Prevention of Significant Deterioration, supra note 38 (“New Source Review
consists of two programs: prevention of significant deterioration in air quality and nonattainment with air quality standards (NSR). New and modified sources in areas, where the
air quality meets existing standards, and in unclassifiable areas, are required to follow PSD
rules. This means that facilities that emit air pollutants regulated under the Clean Air Act
must obtain a pre-construction permit, demonstrate that the construction will not increase
emissions above a certain threshold, and show that facility operations are in continuous
compliance with the best available control technology (BACT) requirements. In nonattainment areas, where the air does not meet minimum air quality standards, new and
modified sources must obtain pre-construction permits, to offset emission increases with
emission reductions from other sources in the area, and to meet the lowest achievable
emissions rate (LAER).”). The 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act (CAA) required
“sources seeking NNSR [Nonattainment New Source Review] permits [to] meet stricter
requirements than sources seeking PSD [Prevention of Significant Deterioration] permits.”
New York v. U.S. EPA, 413 F.3d at 13. For example, a stationary source seeking a NNSR
permit “must achieve the ‘lowest achievable emission rate’ (‘LAER’) for new or modified
units, whereas sources seeking PSD permits need only use the less demanding ‘best
available control technology’ (‘BACT’).” Id. “To obtain PSD permits, sources must undergo
ambient air quality analyses to show that they will neither violate NAAQS increments nor
adversely affect air quality in national parks or other areas that EPA has designated as
needing particularly high-quality air.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (2000)).
54. Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
55. Id.
56. See New York v. U.S. EPA, 413 F.3d at 13 (observing that Congress compromised
when making only new or modified facilities subject to the New Source Review permitting
requirements). Plant operators of older coal-fired plants were thus not required to retrofit
their EGUs “with additional pollution control technology, such as scrubbers.” United States
v. Ohio Edison Co., No. 2:99-CV-1181, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25464, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Jan.
22, 2003).
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B. The CAA Permitting Process
The states are responsible for implementing the NSR and PSD
programs.57 The PSD portion of NSR “is a permit program designed to
minimize emissions from new sources and existing sources making major
modifications.”58 The 1990 CAA amendments59 required the states “to
57. New Source Review Permits, EPA, http://yosemite.epa.gov/R10/Airpage.nsf/web
page/New+Source+Review+Permits/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2013) (“In many cases the federal
NSR programs are implemented by delegated or approved State/local/tribal air agencies. The
Region 10 Office advises and assists states, local governments, and tribes on matters relating
to the development and implementation of NSR, and takes rulemaking action to approve or
disapprove state, local, and tribal implementation of the federal programs.”); see also
Memorandum from Stephen D. Page, Dir., EPA, to Michael Kenyon, Region 1, EPA, et al.,
1, available at http://www.epa.gov/NSR/guidance.html (noting that states implement the
New Source Review Program).
58. Fact Sheet—Proposed Rule: Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V
Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/NSR/fs20090930action.html (last
visited Mar. 24, 2013). The NSR permitting program is divided into two programs: one for
Prevention of Serious Deterioration (PSD) in attainment areas and another for Nonattainment
New Source Review (NNSR) in nonattainment areas (NAs), applicable to areas that fail to
meet the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). Justice Souter explained:
Congress added two air pollution control schemes to the Clean Air Act: New
Source Performance Standards (NSPS) and Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD), each of them covering modified, as well as new,
stationary sources of air pollution. The NSPS provisions define the term
“modification,” while the PSD provisions use that word “as defined in” NSPS.
Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 565-66 (2007) (citation omitted). The PSD
requirements apply to areas that comply with NAAQS. In contrast, NNSR applies to
nonattainment areas. A federal court described these opaque statutory provisions:
In 1977, the CAA was amended to include two additional source programs,
the Prevention of Significant Deterioration [“PSD”] and the Non-Attainment New
Source Review Requirements [“NNSR”]. PSD applies to all new emissions
capacity in areas meeting NAAQS and NNSR applies to all new emissions
capacity in areas not in compliance with NAAQS, i.e., nonattainment areas. The
PSD and NNSR provisions are collectively referred to as the New Source Review
[“NSR”] Program. The NSR provisions apply to both new and “modified”
sources of air pollution. The provisions require “major emitting facilities” to
obtain permits prior to construction as well as installation of state of the art
pollution control technology under the direction of the permitting agency. . . .
....
The definition of “modification” used in the NSPS provisions applies to the
NSR provisions.
United States v. Ohio Edison Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 829, 849-50 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (alterations
in original) (citation omitted). In addition, the NSR provisions make exemptions for “routine
maintenance, repair and replacement” as those terms are used in the NSPS provisions. Id. at
850 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(2)(iii)(a) (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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administer a comprehensive permit program for the operation of sources
emitting air pollutants.”60 States exempt existing power plants but utilities
are subject to state permitting when they refurbish or modify their
electricity generating units.61
New power plants must implement “MACT [maximum achievable
control technology]—and not BACT [best available control technology]—
. . . to a coal-fired plant’s emissions of hazardous pollutants like
mercury.”62 A major stationary source, for example, must install the BACT
for an attainment pollutant or achieve the Lowest Achievable Emission
Rate (LAER) in a nonattainment area.63 The EPA describes preconstruction
59. The amendments are as follows:
The principal changes to the Clean Air Act wrought by the Congress in 1990
address the subjects of nonattainment (tit. I, 72 pages), mobile sources (tit. II,
60 pages), hazardous air pollutants (tit. III, 53 pages), acid deposition control
(tit. IV, 50 pages), permits (tit. V, 13 pages), stratospheric ozone protection (tit.
VI, 24 pages), and enforcement (tit. VII, 13 pages).
1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AIR AND WATER § 3:1B (Supp. 2012).
60. MCCARTHY, supra note 40, at 15.
61. See Karl A. Karg, EPA is Taking a More Aggressive Role in Clean Air Act
Enforcement Against Owners of Coal-Fired Generating Units, Including the Targeting of
Municipalities for “Informal” Enforcement Negotiations, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, 1 (Dec.
8, 2010), http://www.lw.com (search for “Client Alert 1108”; then follow “EPA is Taking a
More Aggressive Role in Clean Air Act Enforcement” hyperlink) (“Many coal-fired
facilities in the Eastern half of the country contain ‘vintage’ coal-fired units dating back to
the 1950’s or 1960’s, and these units were essentially grandfathered into the Clean Air Act’s
permitting scheme under the PSD/NSR provisions. The theory behind the grandfathering
scheme is that at some date certain, these older units will reach the end of their useful lives
and not be functional unless they undergo ‘major modifications.’ Once this point is reached
and a ‘major modification’ occurs, PSD/NSR review is triggered and the older unit is subject
to BACT. If, however, the unit is merely maintained in a ‘routine’ manner (routine
maintenance, repair and replacement (RMRR)), PSD/NSR review is not triggered.”);
Spence, supra note 44, at 195 (stating that plants grandfathered by the CAA regulations,
“many of them in the Midwest, continued to pollute at essentially unregulated rates long
after the passage of the Act, depositing acid rain and other pollution on downwind states”).
62. Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs., L.P., 627 F.3d 134, 140 n.8 (5th
Cir. 2010); see, e.g., Christina C. Caplan, Comment, The Failure of Current Legal and
Regulatory Mechanisms to Control Interstate Ozone Transport: The Need for National
Legislation, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 169, 186 (2001) (“The complaints allege that the companies
made major modifications at their plants that triggered NSR permitting requirements, but
that the companies failed to apply for the necessary permits and to install ‘best available
control technology’ (BACT) as required under the NSR program.”).
63. The EPA describes:
New Source Review [as consisting] of two programs: prevention of significant
deterioration in air quality and non-attainment with air quality standards (NSR).
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permits as regulating “air emissions control requirements that apply to a
facility, such as national emissions standards for hazardous air pollutants,
new source performance standards, or best available control technologies
required by a PSD permit.”64 A coal-fired plant modifying its EGU must
fulfill eight steps:
(1) a permit setting forth emission limitations must be issued; (2)
the proposed permit [must be] analyzed and a public hearing . . .
held; (3) the owner must demonstrate that emissions will not
increase emissions (using several parameters); (4) [the owner
must] ensure that the proposed facility is subject to the best
available control technology (“BACT”) for pollutants; (5) [the
owner must] comply with those BACT provisions; (6) [the
owner must] study projected impacts that may result from the
growth of the facility; (7) the owner/operator must agree to
monitor to determine the effect of emissions from the facility;
and (8) [the owner must attain] certain approval that is not
relevant to this case.65

New and modified sources in areas, where the air quality meets existing
standards, and in unclassifiable areas, are required to follow PSD rules. This
means that facilities that emit air pollutants regulated under the Clean Air Act
must obtain a pre-construction permit, demonstrate that the construction will
not increase emissions above a certain threshold, and show that facility
operations are in continuous compliance with the best available control
technology (BACT) requirements. In non-attainment areas, where the air does
not meet minimum air quality standards, new and modified sources must obtain
pre-construction permits, to offset emission increases with emission reductions
from other sources in the area, and to meet the lowest achievable emissions rate
(LAER).
National Enforcement Initiatives for Fiscal Years 2008 - 2010: Clean Air Act: New Source
Review/Prevention of Significant Deterioration, supra note 38. The Clean Air Act requires:
[A state] to designate those areas within its boundaries where the air quality is
better or worse than the NAAQS for each criteria pollutant, or where the air
quality cannot be classified due to insufficient data. An area that meets the
NAAQS for a particular pollutant is termed an “attainment” area; one that does
not is termed a “non-attainment” area.
Third Amended Intervenor Complaint ¶ 49, United States v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp.,
No. C2-99-1182 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 17, 2004).
64. Fact Sheet—Proposed Rule: Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V
Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, supra note 58.
65. United States v. La. Generating, LLC, No. 09-100-JJB-CN, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
137973, at *6 (M.D. La. Dec. 1, 2011) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(1)-(8) (2006)).
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Coal-fired plants that undertake major modifications to their facilities
easily exceed the CAA regulation’s threshold of emitting at least “100 tons
per year of any regulated pollutant, plus stationary and area sources” or
emit smaller amounts of certain specified hazardous air pollutants.66
Emission limitations depend, in part, upon whether the source is located in
an attainment area or nonattainment area.67 A coal-fired plant located in a
nonattainment area may be subject to NNSR permitting even if it “emit[s]
as little as 50, 25, or 10 tons per year.”68
The EPA mounted its nationwide civil punishment campaign against the
coal-fired plants only after alternative legislative or enforcement strategies
failed.69 The goals of the EPA enforcement initiative were to improve air
quality, “reduce illness, protect lakes and streams,” and restore the
environment.70 Our permitting violations study, presented in Part II of this
article, is the first statistical analysis of penalties, civil mitigation, and
compliance costs for consent decrees and settlements entered into under the
EPA’s coal-fired plant enforcement initiative.
In every EPA settlement in this study, the electricity generator agreed to
reparative or restorative projects to address the harm it had caused to the
public. One of the earliest cases arising out of the EPA’s coal-fired plant
enforcement initiative, for example, was the 2003 settlement agreement
with Alcoa.71 The EPA required Alcoa to undertake injunctive relief valued
at $330 million, including retrofitting an existing plant with state-of-the-art
66. MCCARTHY, supra note 40, at 15.
67. If a coal-fired plant is seeking a NNSR (Non-attainment New Source Review)
permit, it “must meet stricter requirements than sources seeking PSD permits.” New York v.
U.S. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Sources seeking NNSR permits
“must achieve the ‘lowest achievable emission rate’ (‘LAER’) for new or modified units,
whereas sources seeking PSD permits need only use the less demanding ‘best available
control technology’ (‘BACT’). At a minimum, LAER and BACT are as restrictive as
NSPS.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2000)).
68. MCCARTHY, supra note 40, at 15.
69. See The Power Plant Enforcement Effort, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/
resources/cases/civil/caa/tvacoal-fired.html#powerplant (last visited Mar. 24, 2013) (“The
total combined sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides emission reductions secured from these
settlements will be well over 2 million tons each year once all the required pollution controls
have been installed and when other required actions (such as unit retirements) have been
implemented.”).
70. Complaint at 2, Sierra Club v. Duke Energy Ind., Inc., No. 108CV00437 (S.D. Ind.
Apr. 3, 2008), 2008 WL 2548888; see also Complaint at 2, United States v. Alcoa Inc., No.
103CV00222 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2003) 2003 WL 25757481.
71. Alcoa, Inc. Clean Air Act Settlement, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/
resources/cases/civil/caa/alcoa.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
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pollution controls to eliminate sulfur dioxide.72 Alcoa also agreed to pay
$1.5 million to the United States Treasury.73
The Alcoa settlement incorporated concepts of restorative justice in
addition to deterrence. Under the consent decree, Alcoa provided $2.5
million to fund environmental projects such as retrofitting school buses in
Texas with pollution control devices.74 In addition, Alcoa agreed to provide
$1.75 million to the Trust for Public Lands to purchase and maintain
property, to protect clean air, and to safeguard habitats for wildlife.75
Alcoa’s creation of wildlife habitats exemplifies a polluting utility agreeing
to fund environmental projects, thus achieving restorative justice’s goals of
reparation and reconciliation.76
II. Empirical Study of EPA Final Settlements with Coal-Fired Plants
A. Methodology for Coal-Fired Plants Permitting Violations Study
From the late 1970s through the 1990s, the coal-fired electricity industry
often bypassed the costly permitting process when retrofitting power plants,
thus circumventing its obligation to secure permits and minimize toxins. In
the wake of this industry-wide defiance, on November 3, 1999, the United
States Department of Justice and the EPA began their enforcement
campaign by filing complaints against seven different utility giants.77 Our
72. Id. (“On April 9, 2003, the Environmental Protection Agency and Department of
Justice announced a major Clean Air Act settlement with Alcoa, Inc., under which the
company will likely spend over $330 million to install state-of-the-art pollution controls to
eliminate the vast majority of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions from the power
plant at Alcoa’s aluminum production facility in Rockdale, Texas.”).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (requiring Alcoa to set aside “$1.75 million to the Trust for Public Lands, a
national conservation organization, to purchase and maintain property designed to extend
and protect the clean air, and the existing Houston toad habitat of the ‘Lost Pines[’]”).
76. The mediation projects that the coal-fired plants undertook were reparative. “With
restorative justice, the verdict of punishment as a sign of counterfactual stabilisation [sic] of
the norm finds a ‘functional equivalent’ in the compensation, or restoration of the damages
and sufferings inflicted on the aggrieved party.” BRUNILDA PALI & CHRISTA PELIKAN,
BUILDING SOCIAL SUPPORT FOR RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: MEDIA, CIVIL SOCIETY AND CITIZENS
19 (2010), available at http://www.euforumrj.org/Projects/Final%20Report%20BSS.pdf.
The public health harms are diffuse, statistical, and probabilistic, so it is difficult to have the
true interaction between perpetrator and victim. Thus, the EPA settlements are a proxy for
restorative justice augmenting civil penalties.
77. These actions were filed against major industry players including American Electric
Power Company, Cinergy, FirstEnergy, Illinois Power, Southern Indiana Gas & Electric
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empirical study analyzes all twenty-two final settlements with the EPA and
the Department of Justice that resolved all claims where a utility failed to
obtain a permit before making major modifications.78 These consent
decrees and settlements for permitting violations were resolved between
January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2011.79
Each of these final settlements consisted of three components: (1) EPA
civil penalties, (2) required mitigation projects, and (3) the cost of
complying with injunctions.80 Means, medians, and modes were calculated
for each component of the final settlement.81 The study provides a baseline

Company, Southern Company and Tampa Electric Company. Coal-Fired Power Plant
Enforcement Initiative, supra note 10.
78. See id. (presenting civil judicial complaints, notices of violations, and administrative
orders for coal-fired plant defendants).
79. See id. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to compute
all empirical findings. IBM® SPSS® Statistics is a comprehensive set of data and predictive
analytics tools used by social scientists, data analysts, and statistical programmers. To
conduct our research, we completed a content analysis of every consent decree and
settlement published by the EPA on its coal-fired plant initiative. In addition, we coded
information such as the year, state, aggravated misconduct, and tons of pollutants reduced by
the final settlements, as well as computed the size of the civil penalty assessed, cost of
mitigation projects, cost of injunctive relief, and a grand total of these financial costs of
noncompliance with EPA permitting regulations. When we coded the United States
Department of Justice consent decrees and settlements, we employed the most conservative
measures. We did not make adjustments for inflation over the past ten years. If the EPA
reported a range for the cost of mitigation projects or injunctive relief, we reported the
lowest value on the range. If a given component of recovery was not reported, we recorded
“zero” even though this conservative assumption underestimates the costs. Our findings on
the size of past civil penalties, mitigation projects, and injunctive relief reflect a complete
universe, rather than a statistical sample, of decided cases.
80. All twenty-two coal-fired plants had violated the Clean Air Act’s Prevention of
Significant Deterioration/Nonattainment New Source Review provisions, 42 U.S.C. §§
7470-92, 7501-15. These provisions require plant owners to obtain permits and implement
pollution technology controls to minimize air toxics. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-92, 7501-15
(2006).
81. The mean (average), median, and mode are the measures of central tendency
generally used in statistical analysis. The mean is the average value in a distribution,
whereas the mode is the most frequent score in a data set. The median is the value that
divides the distribution exactly into halves—50% are below it, and 50% are above it. The
median may not actually occur in the distribution, but is the “balance point” of the
distribution. The principal advantage of the median is that it is unaffected by outliers, as the
mean is and the mode can be. In distributions that are clearly skewed, such as the cost of
injunction compliance, the median provides a better estimate of what the typical penalty is.
For example, a single multi-billion dollar award will inflate the averages (mean) but will
have little impact on the midpoint (median). The mode did not offer a useful measure of
central tendency in such a small sample, but was reported when it shed light on the data.
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that may be employed by courts when calibrating civil penalties, mitigation
costs, and injunctive relief in future enforcement actions.82 Appendix A lists
all twenty-two settling companies by name, aggravating circumstances, size
of civil penalties, cost of mitigation, cost of compliance with the injunction,
and federal court citation for each coal-fired plant violator.83
B. Empirical Findings on the EPA’s Final Settlements with Utilities
The twenty-two settling utilities consisted of three government owned,
fourteen investor owned, and five cooperative or nonprofit utility owned
entities. For the twelve cases where megawatt capacities (MW) were
reported, the coal-fired plants ranged from 212 to 27,000 megawatts. The
agreed upon reductions in tons of air contaminants (not hazardous
pollutants but rather conventional pollutants) ranged from 1845 tons per
year to 231,000 tons per year. Table 1 presents three measures of central
tendency (mean, median, and mode) for the three parts of each consent or
settlement agreement: (1) amount allocated to civil penalties; (2) cost of
civil mitigation penalties ordered by the court; and (3) cost to the defendant
utility of complying with ordered injunctive relief. Many of these coal-fired
plant cases required utilities to pay hundreds of millions of dollars, which
sends a clear deterrent message.
FINDING #1: SETTLEMENTS AVERAGED MORE THAN $760
MILLION
Table 1 illustrates why EPA enforcement is a hot button issue for the
electricity industry. The twenty-two settlements cost the defendants a total
of more than $16.7 billion. The mean (average) total cost (civil penalty plus
mitigation costs plus injunctive costs) for the twenty-two settlements was
82. We also compiled data on tons of air toxics reduced in these cases and its
association with the size of the remedy. The permitting violation database also contains
information on the year of the penalty, state or jurisdiction, type of air toxics emitted, and
any aggravating circumstances. Our empirical research uncovered no cases where a coalfired plant or other utility had been assessed fines for failing to seek a MACT determination
because most coal-fired plants were grandfathered in and had no requirement to comply with
CAA section 112 until they undertook major modifications. Professor Hsu explains that the
problem with grandfathering is that it creates a regulatory environment where extant
facilities have “an incentive to keep old, grandfathered facilities up and running.” Shi Ling
Hsu, What’s Old Is New: The Problem With New Source Review, REGULATION, Spring 2006,
at 36, 38, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv29n1/v29n1-1.pdf.
83. A comprehensive account of each of the consent decrees and settlements is found at
Coal-Fired Power Plant Enforcement Initiative, supra note 10.
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$762.1 million, over three quarters of a billion dollars per settlement. The
median cost of complying with the injunction was $368.5 million. These
substantial costs do not take into account the utilities’ legal expenses such
as attorney’s fees, payments to experts, and other litigation costs.
Table 1: Final Settlement or Consent Orders for Failure to File CAA
Permits84
Civil Penalty
Imposed in
Decree
N Valid

Mitigation
Projects Cost

Estimated Cost of
Compliance with
Injunction

Grand Total

22

22

22

22

Mean

0
$3,590,909

0
$27,990,909

0
$730,681,818

0
$762,145,454

Median

$1,875,000

$6,125,000

$368,500,000

$375,600,000

$850,000

$2,500,000

0

14,000,000

$79,000,000

$615,800,000

$16,075,000,000

16,767,200,000

Missing

Mode
Sum

(Source: EPA Coal-Fired Plant Enforcement Initiative (2000-2011))
FINDING #2: CIVIL PENALTIES WERE THE SMALLEST
COMPONENT OF THE SETTLEMENTS
The lowest civil penalty imposed on settling utilities for permitting
violations was $100,000 while the largest was $15 million.85 The mean civil
84. We employed the most conservative assumptions in computing the cost of
mitigation projects and injunctive relief. For example, in a case where the violator’s cost of
complying with the injunction had a range of three billion dollars to five billion dollars, we
chose the lower number. If no dollar figure was reported for either the mitigation or
injunctive relief, we coded the amount as zero.
85. These numbers may understate the true cost because a violator has tax incentives to
minimize the amount allocated to civil penalties. Civil penalties are not tax deductible,
whereas expenditures for civil mitigation projects and compliance with injunctions may be
written off as business expenses. The principal federal tax code provision authorizing the
deductibility of settlement payments to government agencies is 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2006).
Section 162(a) allows a deduction of “all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business.” I.R.C. § 162(a)
(2006). See generally 2000 I.R.S. N.S.A.R. 10768, 2000 WL 34416689 (June 1, 2000)
(“Payments to settle a claim against a corporation in a lawsuit have been held to be ordinary
and necessary business expenses as long as the payments were a reasonable way of
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penalty payment was $3.6 million, with a median payment of $1.9 million.
The sum of all civil penalties assessed was $79 million, a relatively small
amount when compared with the money expended by these electricity
producers for mitigation projects, which totaled $615.8 million. Settling
coal-fired plant permitting disputes cost utilities an average of twenty-eight
million dollars for mitigation projects alone. The median cost for mitigation
projects ordered was $6.1 million. The total sum for the cost of utilities
complying with injunctions was $16.1 billion.
The EPA imposes civil penalties if a plant began construction or
embarked on a major modification without obtaining a valid permit.86 A
court’s penalty assessment ideally captures the full social cost of a utility’s
conscious disregard of its duty to apply for a MACT determination. Section
120 of the CAA provides for augmented remedies for “delayed compliance
orders, designed to deprive the polluter of any financial savings realized as
a result of delayed compliance with the law.”87 When starting with the
maximum penalty, courts will typically consider the factors described in 42
U.S.C. § 7413 to determine whether there is any reason to mitigate the
punishment.88 Failure to seek permitting to implement MACT is likely to be
the result of an impermissible cost/benefit analysis that trades public health
for short-term profits. In cases where a utility has purely economic reasons
for noncompliance with EPA permitting, the willful violation will be
considered an aggravating factor.89
Section 113(b) of the CAA allowed plaintiffs to seek up to $32,500 per
day for violations between March 15, 2004, and January 12, 2009.90 After
January 12, 2009, the maximum penalty was increased to $37,500 per

protecting the corporation or mitigating potential damages.”). This provision, however,
contains an important limitation. Under section 162(f), a deduction is disallowed for a “fine
or similar penalty paid to a government for the violation of any law.” I.R.C. § 162(f).
86. EPA, PERMIT PENALTY POLICY FOR VIOLATIONS OF REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO
NEW AND MODIFIED SOURCES UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT, at 2-3 (Feb. 3, 1981), available at
www.envinfo.com/caain/enforcement/caad8.html.
87. FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ch. 2, § 3 (Matthew Bender
2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7420 (2006)).
88. Pound v. Airosol Co., 498 F.3d 1089, 1095 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating principle that a
court begins with the maximum penalty and then examines 42 U.S.C. § 7413 in order to
determine whether there is a basis for mitigation).
89. See Clean Air Act Stationary Source Civil Penalty Policy, EPA, 16 (Oct. 25, 1991),
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/caa/stationary/penpol.pdf [hereinafter
Civil Penalty Policy] (treating degree of willfulness or negligence as an aggravating factor in
assessing penalties).
90. 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (2012).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss3/3

2013] RESTORATIVE JUSTICE TO SUPPLEMENT PUNISHMENT 449
day.91 In determining penalties, a utility is liable for each day of its
continuing violation from the time it began construction or modification
without a permit until it secures its MACT approval (if ever).92 This
duration factor likely accounts for some of the variation in the size of civil
penalties, as do the electricity generator’s overall wealth and size of
operations.
FINDING #3: MITIGATION PROJECTS COST THE SETTLING
DEFENDANTS AN AVERAGE OF $28 MILLION, ALMOST EIGHT
TIMES MORE THAN WHAT THEY PAID FOR CIVIL PENALTIES
In the Clean Air Act settlements we studied, mitigation costs far
outweighed the monetary value of civil penalties imposed. Typically, these
mitigation projects require the settling utility to develop a schedule for
implementing the projects.93 Mitigation projects were more than 7.8 times
more costly than civil penalties in coal-fired plant permitting cases.
Table 1 reveals that the median cost for the ordered civil mitigation
projects was $6.1 million for the twenty-two settlements but, as shown in
Table 2 (below), the costs of these remedial projects varied widely. Almost
three-quarters of the coal-fired plant settlements mandated more than four
million dollars for civil mitigation projects, with half of the defendants
91. Id. (showing penalty adjustments and including table showing penalties effective
March 15, 2004, through January 12, 2009, as $32,500 per day and penalties after January
12, 2009, as $37,500 per day).
92. In United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., the Court explained the importance
of considering duration of an offense when imposing civil penalties:
It seems apparent that acquisition in violation of an FTC order banning
“acquiring” certain assets could be such a violation. Any anticompetitive effect
of an acquisition continues as long as the assets obtained are retained, and the
violator could undo or minimize any such effect by disposing of the assets at
any time after the initial transaction. On the other hand, if violation of an order
prohibiting “acquiring” assets were treated as a single violation, any deterrent
effect of the penalty provisions would be entirely undermined, and the penalty
would be converted into a minor tax upon a violation which could reap large
financial benefits to the perpetrator. As we have seen, Congress added the
continuing-penalty provisions precisely to avoid such a result.
420 U.S. 223, 232-33 (1975) (discussing the “‘continuing failure or neglect to obey’”
provision of section 45(l) of the Federal Trade Commission Act and the like provision
included in the Clayton Act in 1959).
93. Dairyland Power Cooperative Settlement, EPA (June 29, 2012), http://www.epa.
gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/dairylandpower.html (describing how mitigation
projects work in Clean Air Act settlements).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013

450

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:427

paying more than six million dollars for civil mitigation to settle their cases.
The lowest amount spent for mitigation projects was $400,000 while the
largest sum for mitigation projects was $350 million. The modal settlement
amount for civil mitigation projects was $2.5 million.
Table 2: Civil Mitigation Costs in Quartiles
Violator’s Cost of Ordered
Civil Mitigation Projects
Valid

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Frequency

Percent

Below
$4,000,001

6

27.3

27.3

27.3

$4,000,001 to
$6,000,000

5

22.7

22.7

50.0

$6,000,001 to
$15,000,000

6

27.3

27.3

77.3

Above
$15,000,000

5

22.7

22.7

100.0

Total

22

100.0

100.0

Many settling utilities agreed to undertake multi-million dollar
expenditures to retrofit or repower extant generating units as a condition of
settling their cases. In some EPA permitting cases, utilities voluntarily
retired their electrical generating units (EGUs) rather than pay the cost of
compliance such as installing state-of-the art pollution controls.94 Older
coal-fired plants were the most likely to retire their power generating units
instead of undertaking expensive retrofitting projects. The energy industry
blames the EPA coal-fired plant initiative, combined with falling energy
prices, for the loss of jobs and potential energy shortfalls.95 Defenders of
94. See, e.g., Northern Indiana Public Service Company Clean Air Act Settlement,
supra note 28 (agreeing to voluntarily retire the Dean H. Mitchell station as part of the
settlement as opposed to retrofitting it to comply with Clean Air Act permitting
requirements); Duke Energy Gallagher Plant Settlement, EPA (Dec. 22, 2009),
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/dukeenergy.html (giving Duke
Electric an option to “elect to either permanently shutdown [sic] or repower the units to burn
natural gas instead of coal”).
95. Kevin Begos, 5 Pa. Coal-Fired Power Plants to Close, YAHOO! (Mar. 1, 2012, 10:59
AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/5-pa-coal-fired-power-231156108.html (“Tougher air
quality rules from the Environmental Protection Agency are forcing some companies to choose
between costly upgrades, closing older plants or building new power plants that can also run on
cleaner-burning natural gas.”); see also Joseph Baker, Out with the Old: More Coal-Fired
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the EPA counter that the retired plants are old, inefficient, and
economically marginal.96 Retrofitting or retiring generating units improved
the quality of the air all Americans breathe.
FINDING #4: THE COST OF COMPLYING WITH INJUNCTIONS WAS
TWENTY-SIX TIMES THE COST OF MITIGATION PROJECTS AND
200 TIMES THE DOLLAR VALUE ATTRIBUTED TO CIVIL
PENALTIES
The largest component of a coal-fired power plant settlement, by far, was
the estimated cost of complying with the EPA ordered injunction. As
Table 1 shows, compliance costs were more than twenty-six times the
utilities’ expenditures for mitigation projects and more than 200 times more
costly than civil penalties. Table 3 below reports the costs of installation of
appropriate pollution controls, further remedial measures, and other monies
paid by the violators in compliance with consent decrees.
As Table 3 reveals, the price of wrongdoing was significant in coal-fired
plant permitting violation actions. The average cost for a violator to comply
with injunctive relief in the twenty-two cases was $730.7 million. The
median cost of compliance for settling utilities was $368.5 million. For
example, in its 2007 settlement with the EPA, Nevada Power agreed to
install pollution controls at an estimated cost of sixty million dollars, which
will reduce nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions “by about 2,300 tons per year
from 2004-2005 levels, an 86% reduction.”97 The EPA’s “$1.2 billion
settlement with the Virginia Electric Power Co. (VEPCO) will eliminate

Generation Closures Announced, ENERGY BOOM (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.energyboom.com/
emerging/out-old-more-coal-fired-generation-closures-announced (“Shutting down old and
seemingly dirty, out of date coal generation is a growing trend among big utilities in the United
States. Most claim that President Obama and his Administration are hurting Americans by
imposing new emission standards and closing these generation facilities, as these closures will
leave serious gaps in needed electricity.”).
96. Jim DiPeso, Old Coal Plants Shift Blame as Well as Costs, DAILY GREEN (Feb. 29,
2012, 6:07 PM), http://www.thedailygreen.com/environmental-news/blogs/republican/coalwoes-linked-to-market (“The sharp decline in natural gas prices, the rising cost of coal, and
reduced demand for electricity are all contributing factors in the decisions to retire some of
the country’s oldest coal-fired generating units. These trends started well before EPA issued
its new air pollution rules.” (quoting a report by energy analyst Susan Tierney) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
97. U.S. Announces $60.7 Million Clean Air Act Settlement with Nevada Power, EPA
(June 13, 2007), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/e87e8bc7fd0c11f1852572a0006
50c05/507b7edf4c7f52a5852572f90065d491!OpenDocument.
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237,000 tons of air pollution each year from eight coal-fired power plants in
Virginia and West Virginia.”98
Table 3: Utilities’ Cost of Compliance with Permitting Injunction
Frequency
< $30
million
$30 million
$60 million

Percent

Valid
Percent

Cumulative
Percent

2

9.1

9.1

9.1

1
1

4.5
4.5

4.5
4.5

13.6
18.2

$85 million

1

4.5

4.5

22.7

$100 million

1

4.5

4.5

27.3

$135 million

1

4.5

4.5

31.8

$200 million

1

4.5

4.5

36.4

$275 million

1

4.5

4.5

40.9

$330 million

1

4.5

4.5

45.5

$337 million

1

4.5

4.5

50.0

$400 million

2

9.1

9.1

59.1

$500 million

1

4.5

4.5

63.6

$520 million

1

4.5

4.5

68.2

$600 million

2

9.1

9.1

77.3

$603 million

1

4.5

4.5

81.8

$1.1 billion

1

4.5

4.5

86.4

$1.2 billion

1

4.5

4.5

90.9

$4 billion

1

4.5

4.5

95.5

$4.6 billion

1

4.5

4.5

100.0

Total

22

100.0

100.0

The EPA not only punishes and deters utilities for past violations; it also
requires utilities to retrofit, retire, or undertake other costly measures to
improve air quality. Northern Indiana Public Service Company’s (NIPSCO)
Clean Air Act settlement included $9.5 million in environmental projects to
atone for “the impacts of past emissions.”99 NIPSCO’s ordered

98. Fact Sheet: 2003 Environmental Enforcement Accomplishments, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE (July 21, 2003), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2003/July/03_enrd_431.htm.
99. Northern Indiana Public Service Company Clean Air Act Settlement, supra note 28.
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environmental mitigation projects include “Clean Diesel Retrofit,
Woodstove/Outdoor Boiler Changeout, and Land Acquisition and
Restoration projects. The remaining money [could] be spent on the
Hybrid/Electric Fleet, Electric Infrastructure, and Electric to Natural Gas
Conversion projects.”100 Each NIPSCO remedial project pays back its direct
victims who reside near the utility’s facilities. Moreover, NIPSCO agreed to
a clean diesel retrofit project through which it will upgrade public diesel
engines to minimize “emissions of NOx and volatile organic compounds
(VOCs).”101 NIPSCO’s other reparative projects include woodstove and
outdoor boiler upgrades, restoration of the Indiana Dunes National
Lakeshore, and the submission of plans for a hybrid fleet.102
FINDING #5: THE TOTAL COST TO SETTLE IS HIGHLY
CORRELATED WITH THE NUMBER OF PLANTS COVERED
Table 4: Scattergram and Symmetrical Measures of the Relationship
Between a Coal-Fired Plant Violator’s Number of Plants Covered by
Decree and the Size of Civil Penalties with Total Sample, (N=22)103

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. A line of best fit is a proxy for a trend line that represents the data on a scatter plot.
Outliers are data points located far away from the best fit line. “When performing least
squares fitting [a method of determining the line of best fit] to data, it is often best to discard
outliers before computing the line of best fit.” Eric Weisstein, Outlier, WOLFRAM RESEARCH,
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Outlier.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013) (emphasis added).
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Value

Asymp. Std.
Error

Approx. T

Approx. Sig.

.935

.036

11.797

.000

.775

.104

5.485

.000

22

Table 4 shows that civil penalties vary with the utility’s number of
noncompliant plants addressed in the settlement agreement. This is logical.
The number of plants covered by a consent decree is a proxy for the assets
of the violator as well as the amount of pollutants emitted by the utility. The
scatter plot in Table 4 depicts a near linear relationship between the number
of plants covered by permitting violations and the size of the costs
expended to settle the case. The Pearson’s r105 of 0.935 indicates a very
strong positive correlation between the size of the penalties assessed and
the number of plants covered by the decree.106 A Spearman correlation was
also computed to adjust for the skewness of the data and the small sample
size.107 A correlation of 0.775 again demonstrates a strong positive

104. This calculation does not assume the null hypothesis and employs the asymptotic
standard error assuming the null hypothesis based on normal approximation.
105. The Pearson’s r correlation tests the magnitude and direction of the association
between the size of EPA civil penalties imposed and the number of plants included in the
settlements and consent decrees of section 112 permit violators. This measure is appropriate
where two variables are on an interval or a ratio scale, such as dollar size of EPA civil
penalties and the violator’s number of coal-fired plants covered by the decree. The Pearson’s
r correlation coefficient is a number between +1 and -1. This number is useful in
determining the magnitude and direction of the association between two variables.
106. The Pearson’s r correlation measures the strength of the correlation between number
of plants and the grand total of dollars paid by past permit violators. The closer the
correlation is to +1 or -1, the stronger the correlation is. Thus an r of 0.935 is statistically
significant at below the 0.001 level. The probability level of 0.001 means that there is only a
1 in a 1000 chance that this relation is a chance occurrence. The number of plants is a proxy
for size of the violator’s operations, which is a critically important factor in achieving
optimal deterrence.
107. The Spearman Rank Order Correlation coefficient, rs, is a non-parametric measure
of the strength and direction of association that exists between two variables measured on at
least an ordinal scale. It is denoted by the symbol rs (or the Greek letter [ρ], pronounced
rho). The test is used for either ordinal variables or for interval data that has failed the
assumptions necessary for conducting the Pearson’s product-moment correlation.
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statistical relationship108 between the total amount that a violator paid to
settle its case and the number of plants.109
Table 5 below depicts the Pearson’s r and Spearman correlation representing
the association between the violator’s number of plants covered by the
settlement agreement and total expenditures to comply with the injunction with
the two largest settlements omitted. This table consists of only twenty of the
twenty-two cases because the two very large outliers were removed from the
analysis as these outsized settlements might unreasonably skew the result
upward. These statistical outliers are the $4.675 billion total costs in the 2007
American Electrical Power settlement and the $4.36 billion grand total in the
Tennessee Valley Authority settlement of 2011.110
Table 5: The Relationship Between Number of Plants and Total Costs
Expended with Two Largest Outliers Excluded (N=20)

108. Online Statistics, Introduction to Bivariate Data, http://onlinestatbook.com/chapter4/
pearson.html (describing a strong positive relationship indicated by a high positive Pearson’s
r correlation).
109. As with the Pearson’s r, the Spearman correlation indicates a positive direction and
a strong association between number of plants and costs expended. In general, the greater the
number of plants covered by a settlement or consent decree, the greater the defendant’s
overall expenditure. However, the scatter plot reveals two outliers in the top right corner,
which are the multi-billion dollar costs in the Tennessee Valley Authority and American
Electrical Power cases. The scatter plot in Table 5 excludes the two large multi-billion dollar
awards.
110. To get a better picture of the association between plant size and costs imposed on
violators, the Pearson’s r was recalculated without these two multi-billion dollar settlements
as illustrated in Table 5. Even without these two outliers, the relationship between number of
plants and the settlement costs remains extremely strong.
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Approx. T

Approx. Sig.

.803

.082

5.714

.000

.694

.127

4.090

.001

20

Even with the two outliers removed, the 0.803 Pearson’s r score reveals that
the greater the number of plants, the larger the total cost to the defendant in
settling the permitting violation.111 As with Table 4, the Spearman Rank
Order Correlation was computed. Table 5 reveals that the Spearman
correlation is statistically significant at the 0.001 level and the relationship
is positive at 0.694.112 The total cost varies depending upon the defendant
utility’s number of coal-fired plants in violation covered by the settlement
agreement.
FINDING #6: THE MEAN CIVIL PENALTY, MITIGATION
PROJECTS, AND COST OF COMPLIANCE ARE ALL LOWER FOR
SINGLE PLANTS VERSUS VIOLATORS WHOSE DECREES
COVERED MULTIPLE PLANTS
Table 6 below represents the eleven coal-fired permitting cases in which
the settlement applied to permitting violations at a single electricity plant as
opposed to multiple facilities. Single plants paid smaller penalties than
utilities with several different noncompliant facilities. In the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) case, for example, the civil penalty was ten million
dollars to settle all claims against the defendant for permitting offenses at
eleven different TVA plants located in Alabama, Kentucky, and
Tennessee.113 In contrast, the Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company

111. The positive correlation indicates that as the number of plants increases, the size of
the grand total r also increases. A negative correlation would have indicated that the two
variables had a negative relationship (as one increased, the other decreased).
112. The Spearman correlation demonstrates a statistically significant relationship
between the size of the violator and size of expenditures to settle its permitting violation case
at the 0.001 level. Like the Pearson’s r score, the Spearman correlation measures the
direction and size of the association between the number of a violator’s plants and what the
coal plant owner paid to settle the case (penalty plus mitigation plus cost of compliance with
the injunction).
113. Tennessee Valley Authority Clean Air Act Settlement, supra note 11; see also Letter
from John H. Hankinson, Jr., Reg’l Adm’r, EPA to Joseph Bynam [sic], Exec. Vice

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss3/3

2013] RESTORATIVE JUSTICE TO SUPPLEMENT PUNISHMENT 457
paid a $600,000 fine for permitting violations at a single plant.114 This
finding demonstrates that the EPA considers the number of generating units
in calibrating punishment.
Table 6: Central Tendency Measures for Single Plant Violators, 20002011, (N=11)
Civil Penalty
Imposed in
Decree
N

Mitigation
Projects Cost

Estimated Cost of
Compliance with
Injunction

Grand Total of All
Costs to Settle
Cases

Valid

11

11

11

11

Missing

0

0

0

0

Mean

$1,113,636

$5,195,455

$194,090,910

$200,163,636

Median

$950,000

$5,000,000

$135,000,000

$139,400,000

Mode115

$850,000

$2500,000

$0

$1,5850,000

Sum

$12,250,000

$57,150,000

$2,135,000,000

$2,201,800,000

As Table 6 reveals, the mean civil penalty for single plant violators
(N=11) was $1.1 million, which is less than one-third of the average
penalty for all twenty-two violators as shown in Table 1. The mean cost of
mitigation projects, $28 million, was 5.39 times larger for the full sample
than the $5.2 million expended by single plant violators. The mean cost of
compliance in single plant settlements was $194.1 million, which was only
27% of the comparable costs of the average violator in the complete sample
($730.7 million). The total average cost to settle single plant cases was
$200.2 million. Even single plant violators paid a heavy price for not
seeking a permit before commencing major modifications in their plants but
multiple plant settlements were considerably more costly.
Courts weigh the magnitude of the construction project and the plant
owner’s assets in determining the size of the penalty necessary to achieve
President, Tenn. Valley Auth. Fossil Power Group (n.d.), available at http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/tvamemo.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
114. Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company (SIGECO) F.B. Culley Plant Clean
Air Act Settlement, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/sigecofb.
html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
115. There is more than one modal value in Table 6. Following the standard statistical
practice, only the smallest value is depicted.
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deterrence. The EPA penalty must dissuade an offender from engaging in
an impermissible cost-benefit analysis by balancing the cost of complying
with the MACT permitting process against corporate profits. Notably,
section 7413 of the CAA does not provide courts with guidance for
determining the assessment of penalties, giving judges considerable
discretion in calibrating civil penalties.116 Our statistical findings
demonstrate that courts consider the financial circumstances of a utility in
setting the per-day penalty to achieve deterrence.117 Courts may take
judicial notice of the violator’s ability to pay based upon a utility’s forward
contracts anticipating a new or modified facility. Alternatively, a court may
determine wealth by considering other financial metrics including low
variable costs, forward energy contracts, or other measures of strong
forward cash flows.
FINDING #7: THE LARGER THE UTILITY, THE BETTER ITS
ABILITY TO PAY AND THE GREATER THE HARM CAUSED BY
THE FAILURE TO EMPLOY THE BEST AVAILABLE ANTIPOLLUTION TECHNOLOGY
Our empirical evidence reveals that civil penalties generally increase
with the amount of environmental damage. The number of plants—a good
proxy for the size of the violator’s operations and ultimately the amount of
emitted air toxics—is a highly significant predictor for the size of penalties,
mitigation costs, and injunctive costs. Congress requires courts to consider
the size of the business because of the obvious relationship of this factor to
deterrence goals.118 These factors point to a strong positive correlation
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (2006).
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979) (“Punitive damages may be
awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his
reckless indifference to the rights of others. In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact
can properly consider the character of the defendant’s act, the nature and extent of the harm
to the plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended to cause and the wealth of the
defendant.”).
118. The EPA has adopted numerous guidance documents explaining its interpretation of
the CAA’s section 113 penalty assessment criteria and how it intends to apply the criteria.
EPA’s Clean Air Act Stationary Source Civil Penalty Policy was issued in 1984 and last
revised in 1991. See Civil Penalty Policy, supra note 89, at 1. The Penalty Policy states that
it “reflects the factors enumerated in Section 113(e) that the court (in Section 113(b) actions)
and the Administrator (in Section 113(d) actions) shall take into consideration in the
assessment of any penalty.” Id. The Penalty Policy highlights the importance of recovering
the economic benefit of the violation and of considering the gravity of the violation. Id. at 4-
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between the amount of electricity produced and the size of the EPA’s
penalty.
Table 7: Past Permitting Violation Cases Where the Facilities in Question
Had Less than 850 Megawatt Capacity
N

Minimum

Maximum

Civil Penalty
Imposed in
Decree

4

$100,000

$1,750,000

Mitigation
Projects Cost

4

$4,900,000

Estimated Cost of
Compliance with
Injunction

4

Grand Total

4

Valid N (listwise)

4

Sum

Mean

Std. Deviation

$3,550,000

$887,500

$675,000

$15,000,000

$31,150,000

$7,787,500

$4,847,400,506

$0

$200 million

$385,000,000

$96.25
million

$81,993,394,043

$15,850,000

$205 million

$419.7
million

$104.925
million

$77,658,273,867

Tables 7 and 8 demonstrate that there is, in fact, a strong relationship
between the amounts of electricity produced, the excess pollution emitted,
and the civil penalty assessed. For the four smallest coal plants (less than
850 megawatts), the average megawattage was 537 (the median was 618).
Table 7 shows that, for these low megawattage plants, the mean civil
penalty was $887,500 and the median civil penalty was $850,000. The
mean cost of mitigation projects for these small coal-fired plants was $7.8
million. The estimated cost of complying with the injunctive relief for this
sample was $96.3 million.119

8. It refers to these considerations as the “preliminary deterrence amount.” Id. at 4. The
policy includes an appendix that specifies a method for calculating economic benefit, which
includes consideration of delayed and avoided cost. Id. at 4-6. It also specifies factors to be
considered in determining the gravity of the violation, which the policy states are “designed
to reflect [the factors] listed in Section 113(e) of the Act.” Id. at 9. The listed factors include:
“actual or possible harm,” “the amount of pollutant[s]” emitted, “sensitivity of the
environment,” “toxicity of the pollutant[s],” length of the violation, and “size of [the]
violator.” Id. at 9-10.
119. One cautionary note is that complete data on the megawattage was only reported for
twelve of the twenty-two cases in the study.
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FINDING #8: THERE IS A LINEAR RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE SIZE OF CIVIL PENALTIES AND TONS OF AIR TOXINS
REDUCED BY THE SETTLEMENTS
As the scattergram in Table 8 illustrates, the EPA and the United States
Department of Justice imposed civil penalties that are roughly proportional
to the amount of excessive preventable air toxins created by the permitting
violation.120 The enforcement actions resulted in an average of 120,725
fewer tons of atmospheric toxics. This linear relationship suggests that the
EPA penalty policy is not applied arbitrarily, but rather reflects true societal
harm.
Table 8: Tons of Pollutants Is Proportional to the Size of Civil Penalties

Courts apply common sense in raising the price of wrongdoing to make
the wealthiest and most serious polluters think twice before they construct

120. One note of caution is that the case settlements did not report reduced particulate
toxics, mercury, or other noxious air pollutants. A more complete study would examine
whether this statistical relationship held for other toxics reduced. Such an analysis is beyond
the scope of this article.
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or modify their plants without the proper permits. The lowest quartile for
settling a coal-fired permitting case ranged from fourteen million dollars to
$105.9 million.121 The monotonic relationship between air toxic reduction
and expenditures confirms that the reduced tonnage of air pollutants is an
important predictor of the penalties paid by utilities.
For the EPA Coal-Fired Plant Initiative as a whole, the enforcement
actions have resulted in an average of 134,344 fewer tons of toxics in the
air Americans breathe.122 The median reduction in SO2 and NOx per year
reduced by each EPA settlement or consent decree entered into by coalfired plants is 57,000 tons of air toxins.123 Deterrence in federal
environmental law requires that large polluters pay a high cost for
wrongdoing and our empirical data confirms that the EPA’s initiative is
based upon deterrence-based punishment.
In the largest of the twenty-two coal-fired plant settlements, American
Electric Power (AEP) agreed to comply with an injunction requiring the
company to reduce its emissions by 813,000 tons of pollutants per year
(tpy) “at an estimated cost of more than $4.6 billion.”124 This record
settlement obligated AEP to implement technology that would lower the
level of nitrogen oxides for each calendar year from 2009 to 2016.125 AEP’s
settlement also required it to reduce annual tonnage of air toxic emissions
from 450,000 tpy to 174,000 tpy from 2010 to 2019, with additional
reductions each year afterwards.126 To achieve these reductions, AEP

121. A larger sample is needed to determine whether the cost of wrongdoing is correlated
with the amount of electricity produced.
122. We computed the number of tons of toxics by developing a frequency distribution
based on data reported in the Clean Air Act Settlements. See Coal-Fired Power Plant
Enforcement Initiative, supra note 10 (all data from January 1, 2003, through April 14, 2011,
was included in our analysis).
123. These tonnage estimates are drawn from the EPA reports of settlements and consent
decrees.
124. American Electric Power Service Corporation Information Sheet, EPA (Oct. 9, 2007),
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/americanelectricpower1007.html.
125. Id. (“In 2006, nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions at these 16 plants totaled 231,000
tons per year. By 2016, these AEP emissions will be reduced to 72,000 tons per year,
continuing in perpetuity. In 2006, sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions at these 16 plants totaled
828,000 tons per year. By 2018, these AEP emissions will be reduced to 174,000 tons per
year, continuing in perpetuity. This SO2 reduction—from a single settlement—is more than
the SO2 emitted from most states (45 out of 50). This reduction in emissions is one of the
largest percentage decreases achieved in any of the United States’ prior settlements with
coal-fired electric utilities, and it reflects a multibillion dollar investment by AEP.”).
126. Id.
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agreed to install and continuously operate pollution controls in each
electrical generating unit in its system.127
The EPA also ordered AEP to disburse sixty million dollars to fund
projects to mitigate the adverse effects of its past emissions, which dwarfed
AMP’s costs of mitigation.128 These restorative expenditures were
subdivided into a federal share for mitigation projects (sixty percent) and a
state share (forty percent).129 AEP’s projects included both the purchase and
restoration of sensitive lands in several Eastern states and improvements in
emissions reduction and nitrogen loading to Chesapeake Bay:130
AEP made physical and operational changes at nine of its plants
that constituted “major modifications” without first undergoing
PSD review or Non-attainment New Source Review (NNSR),
obtaining required permits, and installing and operating Best
Available Control Technology and/or technology reflecting the
Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER) to reduce air
pollution.131
The findings from this study provide a valuable baseline for calibrating
just penalties in future EPA permitting cases. Congress recognizes that
larger CAA penalties are necessary to deter larger utilities.132 The EPA’s
Uniform Civil Penalty Policy requires size to be considered as a proxy for
the defendant’s “ability to pay,” as a factor in calibrating civil penalties.133
Our empirical examination reveals that, in fact, courts do approve decrees
where the civil penalties generally increase relative to the size of the
business. The number of plants, a good proxy for business size, is also a

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. The idea was that AEP would “restore or improve watersheds and forests in national
parks adversely affected by past emissions; reduce nitrogen loading to Chesapeake Bay
through actions such as the acquisition of buffer zones” and take additional actions in
twenty-four states. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Civil Penalty Policy, supra note 89, at 9.
133. See, e.g., Memorandum from Thomas L. Adams Jr., Assistant Adm’r for
Enforcement & Compliance Monitoring, EPA to Assistant & Reg’l Adm’rs (Dec. 16, 1986),
available at http://www.epa.gov/enforcement/documents/policies/civilpenalty-violators.pdf
(noting that the policy applies to the calculation of civil penalties that the EPA imposes on
for-profit publicly held or closely held entities and for-profit entities owned by not-for-profit
entities).
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highly significant predictor of civil penalty size, mitigation expenses, and
injunctive costs.
III. The Integration of Deterrence and Restorative Justice-Based
Enforcement into EPA Final Settlements
The data presented in Part II demonstrate that penalties are calibrated to
the size, harm, and number of plants under the settlement decree, which is
consistent with deterrence-based civil enforcement.134 The EPA policy on
civil penalties, dating from February 16, 1984, establishes deterrence as the
EPA’s primary goal in imposing civil punishment.135 In the standard law
and economics model of deterrence, companies are profit maximizers that
rationally choose their “environmental performance by balancing the
expected costs of polluting with the expected benefits of doing so.”136
Courts must set penalties at a level high enough to discourage a utility from
134. See CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 102 (2003);
Markell, supra note 43, at 3; Marc Melnick & Elizabeth Willes, Comment, Watching the
Candy Store: EPA Overfiling of Local Air Pollution Variances, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 252
(1993).
135. EPA, POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES: EPA GENERAL ENFORCEMENT POLICY GM-21, at
3 (1984), available at http://www.epa.gov/enforcement/documents/policies/epapolicy-civil
penalties021684.pdf. The methodology for assessing a civil penalty under the Clean Air Act
is based upon section 113 of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413, and contains specific factors which
the court may take into consideration:
[(1)] the size of the business, [(2)] the economic impact of the penalty on the
business, [(3)] the violator’s full compliance history and good faith efforts to
comply, [(4)] the duration of the violation as established by any credible
evidence . . . , [(5)] payment by the violator of penalties previously assessed for
the same violation, [(6)] the economic benefit of noncompliance, and [(7)] the
seriousness of the violation.
42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (2006). The court may assess a penalty “for each day of violation.”
Id. § 7413(e)(2). Civil penalties will not be an effective deterrent if they are regarded as
nothing more than the cost of doing business. See United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co.,
420 U.S. 223, 231 (1975); see also Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996)
(“[There is a] close relation between the compensatory and deterrent objectives of tort law,
or, more precisely perhaps, its rectificatory and regulatory purposes. Knowing that he will
have to pay compensation for harm inflicted, the potential injurer will be deterred from
inflicting that harm unless the benefits to him are greater. If we do not want him to balance
costs and benefits in this fashion, we can add a dollop of punitive damages to make the costs
greater.”).
136. JAY P. SHIMSHACK, EPA, MONITORING, ENFORCEMENT, & ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPLIANCE: UNDERSTANDING SPECIFIC & GENERAL DETERRENCE 6 (Oct. 2007), available
at http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/resources/reports/compliance/research/meec-whitepaper.pdf.
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repeating its wrongdoing. The penalty should sting, but not be so severe as
to destroy the corporation’s ability to continue to serve the public by
producing electrical power.
A. The EPA’s General and Specific Deterrence Objectives
“Specific deterrence assesses a price to a particular wrongful act,
whereas general deterrence fulfills the larger function of vindicating the
broader societal interest by making wrongful acts more expensive and less
attractive to potential wrongdoers.”137 When approving a CAA settlement, a
court must consider general deterrence because its decision will send a
message to an industry that has a history of externalizing its pollution costs
by bypassing the CAA permitting process and risking the public’s health
for profits.138 Both specific and general deterrence are predicated on the
assumption that defendants engage in misconduct only after rationally
weighing benefits and potential costs.139
137. Michael L. Rustad, Happy No More: Federalism Derailed By the Court That Would
be King of Punitive Damages, 64 MD. L. REV. 461, 523-24 (2005); see also Michael Rustad
& Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the
Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1318-28 (1993) (describing general deterrence as
sending a cautionary message to other potential wrongdoers).
138. See Coal-Fired Power Plant Enforcement Initiative, supra note 10 (“On November
3, 1999, the Department of Justice and the Environmental Protection Agency announced the
filing of civil complaints against seven electric utility companies operating coal-fired power
plants in the Midwest and Southeast, charging that their plants illegally released massive
amounts of air pollutants over a period of several years and contributed [to] some of the
most severe environmental problems facing the United States today. The companies
involved are American Electric Power Company, Cinergy, FirstEnergy, Illinois Power,
Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Company, Southern Company and Tampa Electric
Company. In separate but related actions, EPA issued Notices of Violations to these same
companies, plus an administrative order against the Tennessee Valley Authority. Perhaps the
most comprehensive, coordinated enforcement effort under the Clean Air Act to date, the
complaints, Notices of Violation and administrative order cover 32 plants located in 10
states.”); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 30 (“The Justice
Department, on behalf of the EPA, today filed seven lawsuits against electric utility
companies in the Midwest and South, charging that 17 of the companies’ power plants
illegally released massive amounts of air pollutants for years, which have contributed to
some of the most severe environmental problems facing the United States today. The EPA
today also issued an administrative order against the Tennessee Valley Authority, charging
the federal agency with similar violations at seven plants.”).
139. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 376 (Ct. App. 1981). In
Grimshaw, Ford’s decision to expose consumers to the risk of an exploding gas tank was
based on a problematic “cost-benefit analysis” that balanced egregiously undervalued
“human lives and limbs against corporate profits.” Id. at 384. Profit maximizers must know
that the worst-case scenario (including punitive damages liability) is more serious than
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The penalty against a coal-fired plant must be large enough so that other
owners or operators of coal-fired plants are not tempted to cut corners on
safety when constructing or modifying an electricity generating facility.
The Supreme Court has recognized that “all civil penalties have some
deterrent effect,”140 but “a threat [of a penalty] has no deterrent value unless
it is credible that it will be carried out.”141 A large body of law and
economics literature notes that efficient deterrence depends on sufficient
punishment for failure to obey the law.142 Research on the relationship
between environmental compliance and deterrence concludes that:
First, environmental monitoring and enforcement activities
generate substantial specific deterrence, reducing future
violations at the targeted firm. Second, environmental
monitoring and enforcement activities generate substantial
general deterrence, reducing future violations at facilities other
than the targeted one. Third, environmental monitoring and
enforcement activities generate not only reductions in violations,
but also significant reductions in emissions.143
The EPA singled out coal-fired plants as a key enforcement priority
because there was widespread noncompliance with the CAA’s new source
permitting law.144
merely paying only what was owed in the first place (compensatory damages and a criminal
sanction), plus legal expenses. Under California law, the maximum criminal penalty for
violating federal automobile safety standards would have been $1,000 per vehicle (and up to
a maximum of $800,000), an amount dwarfed by Ford’s net worth of $7.7 billion and its
after-tax income of $983 million. Id. at 388-89.
140. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185
(2000) (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 102 (1997)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
141. Id. at 186.
142. See, e.g., 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION §
3.11(3) (2d ed. 1993); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 2 at 9, 11-12 (5th ed. 1984); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of
Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982).
143. WAYNE B. GRAY & JAY P. SHIMSHACK, INT’L NETWORK FOR ENVTL. COMPLIANCE &
ENFORCEMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES:
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE ECONOMICS LITERATURE (n.d.), available at http://www.
inece.org/conference/9/papers/GrayShimshack_US_FINAL.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
144. National Enforcement Initiatives for Fiscal Years 2008 - 2010: Clean Air Act: New
Source Review/Prevention of Significant Deterioration, supra note 38. The “EPA
determined that many sources made changes to existing facilities without applying for and
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B. Internalization Versus Gain Stripping Models of Deterrence
Economics-based deterrence theory suggests two broad approaches to
punishment: internalization and gain elimination. Efficient deterrence
requires that a court carefully consider both the benefit captured through an
offense and the gravity of such offense. A gain stripping civil penalty only
returns a utility “to the status quo ante, which does not adequately
communicate the wrongness of the action; adding the reprehensibility-based
fine makes the defendant worse off for his culpable conduct, as he should
be from a retributive perspective.”145 Gain stripping removes the economic
incentive for noncompliance by taking back the ill-gotten gains.146 The goal
of the punishing authority is to shift all of the costs imposed on society by
the offender’s misconduct back onto the offender—i.e., to force the
offender to pay the full societal costs of harmful conduct.147 Thus, the CAA
penalty must be high enough to reflect total societal harm.148

obtaining pre-construction permits. The lack of . . . permitting likely indicates that many
stationary sources are illegally emitting thousands of tons of pollution into the environment
by avoiding these Clean Air Act (CAA) requirements.” Id. Coal-fired plants were selected as
one of four industrial sectors to investigate “based on the probability of past modifications
that require NSR/PSD permits and the overall emissions.” Id. The other sectors selected
were “cement manufacturing facilities, sulfuric and nitric acid manufacturing facilities, and
glass manufacturing facilities.” Id.
145. Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate
Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 297 (2008). “Economists conventionally seek to
implement the goal of complete deterrence by setting penalties that strip any gain to the
defendant from the misconduct, thereby removing any incentive to engage in the conduct.”
Id. at 242.
146. Catherine M. Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages: Theory, Empirics,
and Doctrine, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS (Jennifer H. Arlen ed.,
forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soL3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990
336. (“The primary goal of gain elimination is the complete deterrence of socially
unproductive activities; the primary goal of the property rights model is facilitation of
voluntary market transfers.”); see also United States v. 2639 Meetinghouse Rd., 633 F.
Supp. 979, 994 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (explaining how gain stripping works in the context of
forfeiture).
147. See Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87
GEO L.J. 421, 421 (1998) (“Generally, complete deterrence is accomplished by eliminating
the prospect of gain on the part of the offender.”).
148. See Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40
ALA. L. REV. 1143, 1148 (1988) (“In the absence of punitive damages, enforcement errors
enable injurers to externalize a portion of expected social costs that they cause. Punitive
damages should be set . . . at a level that eliminates the advantage of noncompliance and
forces potential injurers to internalize the expected social costs of their actions.”).
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Gain elimination is accomplished by ensuring that the penalty imposed
on the offender is at least as great as the offender’s realized or expected
benefit.149 Conceptually, this gain consists of at least (1) the direct savings
from not implementing sufficient pollution control equipment or processes
to achieve the MACT emission reduction levels required by a permit,150 (2)
the interest on borrowed money that would accrue during the period of
construction suspension associated with securing the MACT approval, and
(3) the present-day value of thirty years’ cash flow delayed for the period of
time it would have taken a plant to secure its MACT approval. The actual
CAA penalty imposed on the offender should be at least as large as this
minimum gain stripping level and also be calibrated to the seriousness of
the potential harm to the health of the millions of Americans affected by
emitting tons of HAPs into the environment.151
Without a proactive calculation, profit-maximizing polluters would
simply wait until they were caught violating the law before they complied.
The cornerstone of the EPA’s civil penalty program is to recapture any
economic benefit obtained from violating the law. The EPA then adds to
this figure an amount reflecting the seriousness of the violation with respect
to the radius and severity of the harm. The resulting figure is a baseline for
determining the size of the penalty.
C. The EPA’s Restorative Justice Mandate
The EPA’s jurisprudence is not just about deterrence. Congress granted
the EPA the authority to impose substantial civil penalties to enforce the
Clean Air Act,152 specifically declaring that monetary penalties are
149. See Hylton, supra note 147.
150. The EPA has proposed a set of categorical MACT emission levels for coal-fired
plants. The EPA proposal determined that acid gases, such as HF and HCl, would be
adequately controlled in new power plants, if SO2 were limited to 0.40 lb/MWh. 76 Fed.
Reg. 24,976 (May 3, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63).
151. The United States Supreme Court has made it clear in its punitive damages
jurisprudence that not just actual harm, but also “potential” harm, can be considered when
determining whether an award is excessive. In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., the Court upheld a punitive damages award of ten million dollars where actual
damages were slight because there was sufficient evidence demonstrating the potential
damages arising from the energy company-defendant’s bad faith slander of title. 509 U.S.
443, 462 (1993). Later, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Court recognized that
the ratio of a punitive damages award could consider both actual and potential harm. 517
U.S. 559, 582 (1996). In these cases, the Court made clear that the potential harm to other
victims is a factor in setting punishment.
152. The EPA’s penalty policy applies to all of its statutory programs:
In the late 1970’s, the United States Congress gave EPA the authority to
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“necessary for deterrence, restitution and retribution.”153 The 1984 Policy
on Civil Penalties “establishes three general goals: deterrence, fair and
equitable treatment, and swift resolution of environmental problems.”154
This empirical study demonstrates that the EPA utilizes restorative justice
principles to supplement deterrence in achieving this three-part mandate.
The EPA settlement mitigation projects and restorative injunctions share
common ground with the core principles of restorative justice. Restorative
justice is “woven throughout the fabric of the EPA’s mission”155 when it
approves reparation or supplemental environmental projects that have a
close nexus to the individual defendant’s offense.156

impose substantial civil penalties in what was then its four major statutory
programs: Clean Water Act (also referred to as the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act), Clean Air Act, Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). The Agency realized that
the water and air cases would be generating large civil penalties, and the EPA
sought to make the assessment of civil penalties a rational process. On April
11, 1978, the Agency issued a penalty policy addressing the major air and
water violations. That policy directed litigation teams to calculate the violator’s
economic benefit from violating the law as part of the penalty assessment
process.
Jonathan Libber, Making the Polluter Pay: EPA’s Experience in Recapturing a Violator’s
Economic Benefit from Noncompliance, in FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 465, 465 (1989), available at http://www.
inece.org/5thvol1/libber.pdf.
153. S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 373 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3756.
154. DANIEL RIESEL, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 4.04
(1997).
155. J.P. Suarez, Integrating Environmental Justice at the Environmental Protection
Agency, HUMAN RIGHTS, Fall 2003, at 8, 9 (published by the ABA Section of Individual
Rights & Responsibilities), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_
rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol30_2003/fall2003/irr_hr_fall03_epa.html.
156. Brooke E. Robertson, Note, Expanding the Use of Supplemental Environmental
Projects, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1025, 1025 (2009).
One of the most limiting of these requirements is the nexus requirement, which
states that there must be an adequate “relationship between the violation and
the proposed project.” In some situations, there is simply no feasible project
that meets this nexus requirement; therefore, an SEP cannot be included in the
settlement. After the EPA accepts the proposed project, it determines the
appropriate percentage to lower the penalty.
Id. at 1026 (footnote omitted).
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Restorative justice is a jurisprudential tradition that “emphasizes
repairing the harm caused or revealed by unjust behavior.”157 This paradigm
stresses reparations by the wrongdoer rather than retributive justice.158 Most
proponents of this jurisprudential perspective focus on reintegrating violent
criminals into the community by requiring them to right wrongs with the
victim.159 We extend restorative justice principles to the EPA’s mitigation
projects and injunctive relief when a utility agrees to undertake projects to
improve the environment. In each of the twenty-two cases analyzed, the
EPA and the settling defendant agreed to reparative projects that attempted
to rectify environmental harm caused by preventable air pollutants.
The EPA’s encouragement of Supplemental Environmental Projects
(SEPs) in settlements is reparative, not retributive. SEPs are
“environmentally beneficial project[s] that a defendant agrees to undertake
in settlement of an enforcement action, but which the defendant is not
otherwise legally required to perform.”160 The ABA Survey on SEPs
confirms that the restorative justice dimension is designed “to improve or
repair relationships among all stakeholders (i.e., impacted communities,
facilities, and government, at all levels) following an environmental
violation.”161
D. SIGECO Settlement as a Case Study of Restorative Justice
Since all twenty-two settlements involved the same general pattern of
wrongdoing, it is sufficient to explore only a small sample of EPA coalfired plant resolutions in detail.162 The environmental costs of permitting
157. Carolyn Raffensperger, Restorative Justice and the BP Catastrophe, SCI. & ENVTL.
HEALTH NETWORK (June 21, 2010), http://www.sehn.org/blog/?p=394 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
158. See MARTIN WRIGHT, JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS: A RESTORATIVE
RESPONSE TO CRIME 42 (Waterside Press, 2d ed. 1996) (1991).
159. DANIEL W. VAN NESS & KAREN HEETDERKS STRONG, RESTORING JUSTICE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 14 (4th ed. 2010); see also Mary Ann Yeats, “Three
Strikes” and Restorative Justice: Dealing with Young Repeat Burglars in Western Australia,
8 CRIM. L.F. 369 (1997).
160. DAVID WOOLEY & ELIZABETH MORSS, CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK § 11:26 (2012).
161. NICHOLAS TARG ET AL., PUB. LAW RESEARCH INST., Preface to SUPPLEMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS: A FIFTY STATE SURVEY WITH MODEL PRACTICES 3 (Steven
Bonorris ed., 2007), available at http://www.uchastings.edu/site_files/plri/ABAHastings
SEPreport.pdf.
162. The Clean Air Act permits private citizens and environmental groups to initiate
enforcement actions. See David T. Buente, Citizen Suits and the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990: Closing the Enforcement Loop, 21 ENVTL. L. 2233, 2249 (1991). These “private
attorneys general actions” are beyond the scope of this article.
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violations at Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company’s (SIGECO) F.B.
Culley Station coal-fired generating plant illustrate the aggravating
circumstances that led the EPA to launch its enforcement initiative.163 Table
9 depicts the annual death and disease toll from fine particle pollution for
SIGECO’s F.B. Culley Generating Station, a 415-megawatt electricitygenerating power plant, located in Warrick County, Indiana, on the bank of
the Ohio River.164
Table 9: Death and Disease Attributable to Fine Particle Pollution
Emitting From F.B. Culley Generating Station, a 415-Megawatt EGU165
Type of Impact

Annual Incidence

Valuation

Deaths

10

$72,000,000

Heart Attacks

15

$1,600,000

Asthma Attacks

160

$8000

Hospital Admissions

7

$160,000

Chronic Bronchitis

6

$2,600,000

Asthma ER Visits

10

$4000

The excessive and preventable air pollutants emitted by coal-fired energy
plants pose real-world consequences for the health and welfare of
surrounding communities, which justifies the EPA’s campaign to enforce
permitting regulations. The EPA’s notice of violation charged the utility
163. Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company (SIGECO) F.B. Culley Plant Clean
Air Act Settlement, supra note 114 (explaining Clean Air Act violations at SIGECO’s F.B.
Culley coal-fired power plant (Culley Station) that led to settlement).
164. F.B. Culley Generating Station, CTR. FOR MEDIA & DEMOCRACY, http://www.
sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=F._B._Culley_Generating_Station (last visited Mar. 24,
2013). See generally Death and Disease from Power Plants, CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE, http://
www.catf.us/fossil/problems/power_plants/existing/map.php?state=Indiana (last visited Mar.
24, 2013) (“In 2000 and again in 2004, Abt Associates issued a study commissioned by the
Clean Air Task Force, quantifying the deaths and other health affects [sic] attributable to the
fine particle pollution from power plants. In this newly updated study, CATF examines the
progress towards cleaning up one of the nation’s leading sources of pollution. The report
finds that over 13,000 deaths each year are attributable to fine particle pollution from U.S.
power plants. This is almost half the impact that our 2004 study found and is reflective of the
impact that state and federal actions have had in reducing power plant emissions by roughly
half. However, much more still needs to be done.”).
165. Death and Disease from Power Plants, supra note 164.
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with making modifications at its Culley Station such as replacing
components, economizers, outlet sections of secondary super heaters, and a
feed water heater, without obtaining a PSD permit.166 The EPA contended
that none of SIGECO’s modifications fell within the “‘routine maintenance,
repair and replacement’ exemption.”167
The EPA notice charged SIGECO with violations that “resulted in the
release of massive amounts of sulfur dioxide (‘SO2’), nitrogen oxides
(‘NOx’) and particulate matter (‘PM’) into the environment.”168 SIGECO
not only violated the EPA’s PSD requirements, but also Indiana’s State
Implementation Plan (SIP) that prohibited “construction or operation of a
major modification of a major stationary source in an attainment area
without first obtaining a PSD permit.”169 The EPA and Department of
Justice announced a settlement with SIGECO on June 6, 2002.170 This
settlement, like all others in the sample, consisted of three principal parts:
(1) the civil penalty, (2) required mitigation projects, and (3) the cost of
complying with the EPA’s injunction.171 SIGECO agreed to pay a $600,000
penalty and undertake mitigation projects with a nexus to the harm it
caused.172 Finally, it agreed to expend thirty million dollars to install stateof-the-art pollution controls and reduce emissions to comply with the
injunction.173 This unique blending of deterrence and restorative penalties is
166. U.S. EPA, Notice of Violation in the Matter of Southern Indiana Gas and Electric
Company (n.d.), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/novs/civil/caa/novcoal-sigeco.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
167. Id. at 3 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(2)(iii)).
168. Id. at 1.
169. Id. at 2.
170. Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company (SIGECO) F.B. Culley Plant Clean
Air Act Settlement, supra note 114.
171. See id. Appendix A contains details of all the EPA settlements analyzed.
172. Id. (“Under the settlement SIGECO agreed to spend at least $2.5 million for an
environmental project, the Sulfuric Acid Reduction Project, at the Culley Station. The
Sulfuric Acid Reduction Project is designed to reduce the SO3 (sulfuric acid) content in flue
gas at the plant’s largest unit.”). See generally Robertson, supra note 156, at 1044
(explaining the nexus policy where the EPA requires projects have a connection to the
harm).
173. Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company (SIGECO) F.B. Culley Plant Clean
Air Act Settlement, supra note 114. The settlement requires SIGECO to spend “an estimated
$30 million over a 4 to 6-year period to implement the following injunctive relief: [r]educe
emissions of SO2 from about 9,800 tons per year to about 3,400 tons per year.” Id. Further:
SIGECO will either retire or repower with natural gas and state-of-the-art
pollution controls a third unit. In addition, SIGECO will surrender excess SO2
emission allowances each year beginning in 2004. This surrender will prevent
SIGECO and others from using these allowances to emit additional pollution
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seen in mitigation projects agreed to by the utilities in the other twenty-one
settlements as well.174
E. The TVA Settlement’s Restorative Obligations
The April 14, 2011, EPA settlement with the Tennessee Valley
Authority175 also illustrates how the EPA penalty and remedial measures
policies operate in tandem to achieve restorative justice as well as
deterrence. The EPA first targeted the TVA in November 1999 for
modifying its coal-fired plants “without first complying with Clean Air Act
(CAA)
preconstruction
obligations
that
include[d]
obtaining
preconstruction permits and installing and operating state-of-the-art
pollution control technology.”176 The TVA settlement resolved permitting
violation charges at eleven of its fifty-nine coal-fired plants.177 The energy
provider agreed to pay the U.S. Treasury ten million dollars as a civil
penalty and spend an additional $350 million for life-saving environmental

into the environment.
[SIGECO will also] [a]chieve 4,200 tons of NOx reductions annually from
SIGECO coal-fired plants by operating a new state-of-the art [sic] selective
catalytic reduction control system all year long, on the largest unit at the plant.
In addition, SIGECO will either shut down a second unit or repower that unit
with natural gas and install a state-of-the-art selective catalytic reduction
system.
[Finally, SIGECO will] [i]nstall a state-of-the-art Baghouse at the largest
unit by 2007 to reduce emissions of PM by an estimated additional 200 tons, as
well as optimize current PM controls at all three units to control PM emissions
on all units in the interim.
Id.
174. See Appendix A, containing descriptions of all the EPA settlements included in our
analysis.
175. The TVA “is a corporation owned by the United States government, created and
existing pursuant to the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. § 831-831ee.”
Tennessee Valley Authority Clean Air Act Settlement, supra note 11.
176. Id.
177. Id. The TVA settlement included the following eleven coal-fired plants:
Allen Fossil Plant near Memphis, Tenn.[;] Bull Run Fossil Plant near Oak
Ridge, Tenn.[;] Colbert Fossil Plant in Tuscumbia, Ala.[;] Cumberland Fossil
Plant in Cumberland City, Tenn.[;] Gallatin Fossil Plant in Gallatin, Tenn.[;]
John Sevier Fossil Plant near Rogersville, Tenn.[;] Johnsonville Fossil Plant
near Waverly, Tenn.[;] Kingston Fossil Plant near Kingston, Tenn.[;] Paradise
Fossil Plant in Drakesboro, Ky.[;] Shawnee Fossil Plant near Paducah, Ky.[;
and] Widows Creek Fossil Plant near Stevenson, Ala.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss3/3

2013] RESTORATIVE JUSTICE TO SUPPLEMENT PUNISHMENT 473
mitigation projects.178 The TVA’s obligations included new air pollution
controls, the repowering of renewable biomass, and a commitment to retire
old coal-fired units.179
The SIGECO and the TVA settlement defendants agreed to “heal and put
things as right as possible” by financing pro-environmental projects.180 The
parallel to restorative justice lies in the utilities’ symbolic demonstrations of
good faith in embarking on specific projects for the common good. Just as
restorative justice focuses on the healing of the breach, the wrongdoer, and
the victim through remedial action,181 the EPA’s mitigation projects require
178. Id. The TVA will pay:
[An] estimated $3 to $5 billion on new and upgraded state-of-the-art pollution
controls that will prevent approximately 1,200 to 3,000 premature deaths, 2,000
heart attacks and 21,000 cases of asthma attacks each year, resulting in up to
$27 billion in annual health benefits. TVA will also invest $350 million on
clean energy projects that will reduce pollution, save energy and protect public
health and the environment.
Id.
179. Id. The TVA agreed to meet the following obligations:
An obligation to address 92 percent of TVA’s coal-fired system between 2011
and 2018 with either the installation of state-of-the-art pollution controls such
as selective catalytic reduction (SCR) or flue gas desulfurization (FGD),
retirement, or repowering to renewable biomass: [(1)] For NOx, 60 percent of
TVA’s coal-fired system will be equipped with SCR, 16 percent will be retired,
and 16 percent have the option to retire, retrofit with SCR, or repower to
renewable biomass[; (2)] For SO2, 51 percent of TVA’s coal-fired system will
be equipped with FGD, 16 percent will be retired, and 25 percent have the
option to retire, retrofit with FGD, or repower to renewable biomass[; and (3)]
Permanent retirement of 18 coal-fired units equating to about 16 percent of
TVA's coal-fired electricity generating system—the largest retirement
commitment any settling company has made to date under EPA’s Coal-Fired
Power Plant Initiative.
Id.
180. HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 37 (2002).
181. Restorative Justice, MEDIATION & RESTORATIVE JUSTICE CTR., http://mrjc.ca/
restorative-justice/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2013) (defining the principles of restorative justice
as: “Hold the offender accountable to the victim and the community harmed or impacted by
the crime[;] [r]equire the offender to take responsibility for ‘making things right’ as much as
possible[;] [g]ive the victim a voice, and access to justice, by allowing the victim to
participate in how the offender will be made accountable and redress the harm[; and] [i]nvite
the community to join in supporting the victim, holding the offender accountable, and
providing opportunities for the offender to rejoin the community[.]”); see also Hadar
Dancig-Rosenberg & Dana Pugach, Pain, Love, and Voice: The Role of Domestic Victims in
Sentencing, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 423, 442 (2012) (stating the purpose of restorative
justice is to require the wrongdoer to remedy injuries and thus “promote repair,
reconciliation, and security”).
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the defendant to make a public demonstration of repairing the harm.
Restorative justice aims to restore harmony based on a feeling that justice
has been done.
F. Reconceptualizing Restorative Justice for Environmental Wrongs
The literature on restorative justice is overwhelmingly individualistic in
orientation, dealing with questions such as the proper shaming and
reintegration procedures for criminal offenders.182 The core value of any
restorative justice program is an emphasis on “moral accountability of an
offender toward the victim and the affected community.”183 Restorative
justice theorists’ core principles, however, can be stretched to righting civil
wrongs.184 The moral accountability of corporate polluters should include
some service to the victim, which, in this reconceptualization, is not just an
individual sufferer. Here, the victims are a statistical category in the
community downwind from the toxic air or water.
The primary direct casualties in these CAA coal-fired plant settlements
are the victims of toxic air suffering cardiac arrest, cancer, or
developmental problems. The specific victims of air toxins, however,
cannot be identified with certainty and therefore are unlikely to prevail in
traditional tort litigation against polluters.185 Epidemiological estimates can
only determine the long-term probabilities of harm, not necessarily the
identities of individual victims.186 Therefore, the best restorative justice
proxy for specific victims is to draw upon environmental experts and local
182. See William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler, Corporate Crime and Making Amends, 44
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1307, 1309 (2007); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of
Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-13
(2007).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 3796ee(c) (2006). This emphasis on accountability to the victim is
critical to the restorative justice programs for juveniles at the federal level. See id.
In this section the term “restorative justice program” means a program that
emphasizes the moral accountability of an offender toward the victim and the
affected community and may include community reparations boards, restitution
(in the form of monetary payment or service to the victim or, where no victim can
be identified, service to the affected community), and mediation between
victim and offender.
Id.
184. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION (2002)
(proposing the application of restorative justice solutions to white-collar crime, war crimes,
and political crimes).
185. See Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation,
52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732, 749-50 (1984).
186. See id.
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leaders to represent the interests of the community. The public’s greater
input will not only help design community supported projects to repair
environmental harms, but also emphasize the need for polluters to undo
wrongs by sending signals of healing, responsibility, and preventative
vigilance.187
Restorative justice requires the EPA to continue to inspect coal-fired
plants—investigating the facts, filing enforcement actions, and negotiating
the settlement of each case. However, restorative justice, in its purest form,
calls for some direct input from the victims of these air toxins to determine
projects that the utilities should undertake to rectify the harm inflicted. In
the remedies stage, the EPA could encourage public participation in
determining which projects would best remediate the defendant’s harm.188
This process would give the defendant-corporation increased opportunities
to understand the specific health problems that it has caused and to help
“develop plans for taking appropriate responsibility.”189
Civil mitigation through restorative projects and requiring the polluter to
shoulder the costs of complying with injunctions are both policies that are
consistent with the principles of restorative justice. Companies agreeing to
make amends share common ground with reparative projects to integrate
individual offenders into the community.190 When a utility agrees to install
pollution control equipment to reduce by hundreds of tons the sulfur
dioxide and nitrogen oxides being emitted, it is undertaking a reparative
project. The participation of environmental groups would make it clear that
coal-fired plants or other environmental offenders owe a primary obligation
187. See Fundamental Concepts of Restorative Justice, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, http://
www.nij.gov/nij/topics/courts/restorative-justice/fundamental-concepts.htm (last visited Mar.
24, 2013) (“A restorative justice process maximizes the input and participation or [sic] these
parties—but especially primary victims as well as offenders—in the search for restoration,
healing, responsibility and prevention.”).
188. In the first decade of the coal-fired plant enforcement initiative, the final settlements
often involved greater sums expended for civil mitigation projects than for civil penalties.
See supra Table 1 (comparing mean and median award amounts for civil penalties with civil
mitigation projects). This is consistent with the National Institute of Justice’s principle that
“restitution take[s] priority over other sanctions and obligations to the state such as fines.”
Fundamental Concepts of Restorative Justice, supra note 187. Appendix A, the data
underlying the findings of our study, reveals that the EPA implemented restitution principles
in civil mitigation projects as well as the cost of complying with injunctions.
189. Fundamental Concepts of Restorative Justice, supra note 187.
190. “Restoration is not required unless the ends of justice require it.” Persson v. Smart
Inventions, Inc. 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 335, 346 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Sime v. Malouf, 212
P.2d 946, 963 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949) as amended on denial of reh’g, 213 P.2d 788
(1950)).
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both to the immediate victims and to the affected communities, where air
and water have been degraded by emitting pollution or dumping wastes.191
“Environmental justice, which seeks to protect minority and low-income
communities from disproportionate amounts of environmental
degradation,” clearly has a restorative justice dimension.192
The EPA’s jurisprudence is not limited to coal-fired plant litigation. The
EPA often requires defendants to engage in environmentally beneficial
projects to settle environmental enforcement actions:
[Supplemental
Environmental
Projects
(SEPs)]
are
“environmentally beneficial projects which a defendant . . .
agrees to undertake in settlement of an enforcement action, but
which the defendant . . . is not otherwise legally required to
perform.” In settlements of environmental enforcement actions,
the EPA generally requires alleged violators to comply with
federal environmental regulations and to pay a monetary penalty.
The EPA will reduce the required payment in certain
enforcement actions if the alleged violator agrees to perform a
Supplemental Environmental Project as part of the settlement.
The inclusion of SEPs in settlements furthers the “EPA’s goals
to protect and enhance public health and the environment.” In its
June 2003 memorandum, the EPA noted that SEPs are being
underutilized and that there is tremendous potential to achieve
even greater benefits for the environment with the increased use
of SEPs in settlements.193
191. Few scholars have recognized restorative environmental justice in EPA
enforcement. The Public Law Institute identified a restorative justice dimension in
Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs):
Affected communities stand to benefit from SEPs, as well, particularly as
SEPs encourage restorative justice. The nexus requirement in most SEP
policies results in local or regional environmental projects that help the area
that suffered from the violation in the first place. A particular example of
restorative justice is the policy goal of environmental justice.
Steven Bonorris et al., Environmental Enforcement in the Fifty States: The Promise and
Pitfalls of Supplemental Environmental Projects, 11 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 185, 204-05 (2005) (footnote omitted).
192. Id. at 211.
193. Robertson, supra note 156, at 1025 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).
“The seven specific categories [through which a project may qualify as an SEP] are as
follows: public health, pollution prevention, pollution reduction, environmental restoration
and protection, assessments and audits, environmental compliance promotion, and
emergency planning and preparedness.” Id. at 1031-32 (footnotes omitted); see also
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At present, the EPA has not adopted the restorative justice principle of
seeking the participation of affected communities in determining
supplemental environmental projects. The EPA could work with
community groups on polluter and affected community reconciliation and
restitution, which may result in victim impact statements.194 Restorative
justice in civil enforcement might include restitution, community service,
and reparative community-based projects to right probabilistic civil wrongs
that affect diffuse victims.
G. Restorative Justice as an Emergent Enforcement Paradigm
The principles of restorative justice are prefigured in the enforcement
practices of other federal agencies. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
requires violators to take affirmative steps to repair wrongs, as well as to
prevent fraudulent, deceptive, and unfair business practices in the future.195
Restorative justice has the potential to address the current global financial
crisis by requiring lenders to take affirmative steps to help repair wrongs in
affected communities.196 The FTC’s settlement with Countrywide (and its

Bonorris et al., supra note 191, at 188 (“Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) are
environmentally beneficial projects that go beyond compliance and are undertaken as part of
a settlement of an enforcement action[.] EPA may mitigate a portion of the civil penalty that
otherwise might have been assessed. The project must improve, protect or reduce risks to
public health or the environment. Further, the project must be implemented entirely after the
EPA has identified a violation in order to be part of a ‘settlement of an enforcement action.’”
(footnotes omitted)).
194. Corporations are artificial persons, so remorse is not achievable. But the human
agents of a corporation can be made more accountable through restorative justice. Stephanos
Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal
Procedure, 114 YALE L. J. 85 (2004) (building a case for remorse in criminal law reflecting
restorative justice).
195. See, e.g., Prepaid Phone Card Marketers Agree to Pay $2.32 Million to Settle FTC
Charges, FTC (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/02/millennium.shtm. The FTC’s
settlement with prepaid phone card sellers required them to pay $2.32 million but also to
change their practices. Id. In the future, consumers must receive clear disclosures of fees and
charges. Id. “To ensure compliance, the settlement requires defendants to routinely monitor
the advertising materials displayed by their distributors and the number of minutes of talk
time their prepaid calling cards deliver to consumers.” Id.
196. Professor John Braithwaite advocates “using restorative approaches in addressing
the causes of the global financial crisis and allied financial crises.” Michael King, Blogging
the Non-Adversarial Justice Conference, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ONLINE (May 13, 2010),
http://www.restorativejustice.org/RJOB/blogging-the-non-adversarial-justice-conference.
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successor) reflects restorative justice principles in requiring reimbursements
to homeowners harmed by unfair business practices.197
The United States Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) is the
primary enforcer for reducing injuries and death due to consumer
products.198 In imposing the CPSC’s $1.25 million civil penalty against the
importer of the lead-painted Thomas the Tank Engine children’s toy, the
Commissioner observed, “[t]he tremendous costs associated with a
voluntary or CPSC-ordered recall (over $42 million in this case) provide a
significant financial deterrent.”199 A restorative justice approach to
supplement this deterrence might call for the toy importers to develop
educational programs to inform the public about the dangers of lead paint or
even to remove this hazardous substance from public housing projects.
Restorative justice principles were also embodied in the Master
Settlement Agreement (MSA) with America’s cigarette manufacturers.
“Under the Master Settlement Agreement, seven tobacco companies agreed
to change the way tobacco products are marketed and pay the states an
estimated $206 billion. The tobacco company defendants agreed to finance
a $1.5 billion anti-smoking campaign, open previously secret industry
documents, and disband industry trade groups . . . .”200 These educational
projects were highly appropriate as remediation for the companies’
decades-long conspiracy to conceal the dangers of tobacco products.201
The FTC’s case against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company contended that
the use of the cartoon mascot, Joe Camel, caused children to take up
197. See FTC Settlement with Countrywide, FTC (June 7, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/
bcp/cases/countrywide/index.shtml.
198. About CPSC, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, http://www.cpsc.gov/en/
About-CPSC (last visited Mar. 24, 2013) (“CPSC is committed to protecting consumers and
families from products that pose a fire, electrical, chemical, or mechanical hazard. CPSC’s
work to ensure the safety of consumer products—such as toys, cribs, power tools, cigarette
lighters, and household chemicals—contributed to a decline in the rate of deaths and injuries
associated with consumer products over the past 30 years.”).
199. Statement of Commissioner Anne M. Northup on the Proposed Civil Penalty
Settlement of $1,250,000 for RC2 Corporation, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N
(Dec. 29, 2009), http://www.cpsc.gov/pr/northup12292009.pdf (reporting unanimous vote to
impose a civil penalty for the company’s importation of toys that violated the lead paint
ban).
200. Master Settlement Agreement, STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GEN., http://oag.ca.gov/tobacco/msa (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
201. See, e.g., Public Education Counter-Marketing Campaigns, STATE OF OKLA., http://
www.ok.gov/tset/Programs/Public_Education_Counter-Marketing_Campaigns/index.html (last
visited Mar. 24, 2013) (describing states campaign against anti-smoking funded by tobacco
settlement).
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smoking.202 However, this case was dismissed because the MSA required
the tobacco company to retire the camel mascot, spend “$1.45 billion in
anti-smoking campaigns,” and “reduce[] children’s exposure to all kinds of
tobacco advertising by removing cartoon figures from advertisements and
public relations materials, banning cigarette-branded merchandise, reducing
cigarette sponsorship of concerts and sporting events, and eliminating ads
on billboards, buses, and taxis.”203
Courts should consider community victim impact and relate this factor to
corporate punishment, protection of the public health, general deterrence,
rehabilitation, restitution, and restorative justice.204 Importing concepts of
restorative justice from the criminal justice system can improve the ability
of civil enforcers to meet the needs of community victims, encourage
greater accountability, hold corporate offenders accountable, and provide
rehabilitation and reintegration of corporate wrongdoers into the larger
society through reparative projects with a nexus to the harm.
Conclusion
The distinctive feature of EPA enforcement is that it not only is
deterrence-based, but also embodies core principles of restorative justice.
The joining of these two distinct jurisprudential traditions, both specifically
and generally, deters the polluter while simultaneously repairing past
wrongs through remedial projects. Whether it is pollution, internet privacy
violations, inadequate information security, dangerously substandard
202. Joe Camel Advertising Campaign Violates Federal Law, FTC Says, FTC (May 28,
1997), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/05/joecamel.shtm.
203. Josh Boyd, Organizational Rhetoric Doomed to Fail: R. J. Reynolds and the
Principle of the Oxymoron, 68 WEST. J. COMM. 45, 46 (2004).
204. Restorative justice in the EPA’s coal-fired plant initiative involved polluters taking
responsibility for their permitting violations and making amends to the communities whose
air quality and public health were degraded. Our synthesis of deterrence-based economics
with restorative justice is practical and achievable, as revealed by our data. As John Maynard
Keynes reminds us,
[T]he ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right
and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood.
Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves
to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of
some defunct economist.
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY
383 (Prometheus Books 1997) (1936). What is needed is for the EPA to establish forums
where the owners of coal-fired plants may learn first-hand about the consequences of their
actions.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013

480

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:427

products, or other practices that create diffuse harms, restorative justice
seeks to make corporate persons accountable to society. The EPA’s
enforcement initiative demonstrates that even billion-dollar utilities can be
held accountable, notwithstanding that individual victims may be diffuse
and downwind from the stationary source of pollutants. The EPA might
consider extending the restorative justice dimension by involving the larger
community and environmental action groups more directly in its settlement
and remediation efforts. Local communities surrounding new or modified
coal-fired plants have a clear nexus to the environmental and social effects
from excessive downwind emissions arising from the utility’s failure to
complete a New Source Review, and could be consulted in determining the
most desirable restorative projects.
Other regulatory agencies should consider whether restorative justice
principles can be utilized more extensively to repair wrongs, particularly
when the harms are probabilistic estimates rather than plainly identifiable
sufferers. This emergent paradigm of blended enforcement principles seems
well suited for agencies such as the Consumer Products Safety
Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Securities and
Exchange Commission, all of which enforce regulations protecting the
public. The Securities and Exchange Commission, for example, could
incorporate a restorative justice dimension holding defendants accountable
to the victims of Rule 10b-5 violations205 in cases where the victims are
diffuse.206 Courts can also become more receptive to including reparative
remedies for serious violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law.
Future research should be directed toward exploring whether restorative
justice strengthens communities and reduces re-offending for corporate
wrongdoers, as its advocates claim. For too long, the restorative justice
approach has been conceptualized as diametrically opposed to deterrence
models. Creative solutions that blend the best features of the two
perspectives can and should be adopted.
205. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
206. Most academics view restorative and retributive justice as an “either or”
proposition, but there are a few scholars who, like us, view restorative and retributive justice
as fulfilling distinct functions. Professor Joan Heminway, for example, “argues that the
increased involvement of victims in Rule 10b-5 prosecutions, as an adjunct to existing
processes and penalties, may better help to satisfy societal needs for justice and vengeance,
achieve desired deterrence, and effectuate investor confidence and market integrity.” Joan
MacLeod Heminway, Hell Hath No Fury Like An Investor Scorned: Retribution,
Deterrence, Restoration, and the Criminalization of Securities Fraud Under Rule 10b-5, 2 J.
BUS. & TECH. L. 3, 14 (2007).
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APPENDIX A
Cost of Civil Penalties, Mitigation Projects, & Compliance With
Injunctions in Coal-Fired Settlements & Consents (2000-2011)

Name of
Company &
Year

Tennessee
Valley
Authority
(TVA)
(2011)207

Northern
Indiana
Public
Service
Company
(NIPSCO)
(2011)208

Conduct Leading to EPA
Permitting Violation

“TVA modified a
number of coal-fired
units at nine of TVA’s
plants without first
complying with Clean
Air Act (CAA)
preconstruction
obligations that include
obtaining
preconstruction permits
and installing and
operating state-of-the-art
pollution control
technology (CAA
Prevention of Significant
Deterioration/Nonattainment New Source
Review provisions, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7470-7492,
7501-7515).”
“NIPSCO modified a
number of its coal-fired
power units without first
complying with Clean
Air Act (CAA) preconstruction obligations
that include obtaining
pre-construction permits
and installing and
operating state-of-the-art
pollution control
technology. (CAA
Prevention of Significant
Deterioration/Nonattainment New Source
Review provisions, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7470-7492, §§
7501-7515; and Title V
of the CAA).”

Amount of
Civil Penalty

$10 million

$3.5 million

Total Cost of
Mitigation Project,
Injunctive Relief,
& Supplemental
Projects

Mitigation
projects: $350
million; in
addition, cost of
complying with
injunctions was $3
billion to $5 billion
(used mid-point of
$4 billion as
estimate). (Total:
$4.35 billion)

“This settlement
also requires
NIPSCO to spend
$9.5 million on
environmental
mitigation
projects” and
another $600
million in costs
associated with
injunctive relief.
(Total: $609.5
million)

Grand Total
of Combined
Costs of
Settlement

$4.36 billion

EPA Docket
No. CAA-042010-1528(b)

$613 million

Consent
Decree, N.D.
Ind.

207. Tennessee Valley Authority Clean Air Act Settlement, supra note 11.
208. Northern Indiana Public Service Company Clean Air Act Settlement, supra note 28.
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Hoosier
Energy Rural
Electric
Cooperative,
Inc. (2010)209

American
Municipal
Power
(AMP)
(2010)210

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
“Hoosier made
modifications at the
Merom plant without
first complying with the
New Source Review
program’s preconstruction obligations,
which include, obtaining
pre-construction permits
and establishing an
emission limitation
based upon Best
Available Control
Technology, in violation
of: The Clean Air Act
(CAA), Prevention of
Significant Deterioration
provisions, 42 U.S.C. §§
7470-7492,” Indiana’s
State Implementation
Plan and “Title V of the
Clean Air Act and the
Indiana Title V
regulations.”
“[M]odifications were
made at the Gorsuch
Station without first
complying with preconstruction obligations,
including obtaining preconstruction permits and
installing and operating
state-of-the-art pollution
control technology, in
violation of” the CAA,
PSD/NSR Provisions
and New Source
Performance Standards.

$950,000

$850,000

“This settlement
also requires
Hoosier to spend
$5 million on
environmental
mitigation projects
to address the
impacts of past
emissions”
(mitigation) and
$275 million in
pollution control
technology that
will protect public
health and “resolve
violations of the
Clean Air Act”
(estimated $250
million to $300
million for
Injunctive Relief).
(Total: $280
million)
“This settlement
also requires AMP
to spend $15
million on
environmental
mitigation projects
to address the
impacts of past
emissions.” No
cost of injunction
listed on consent
decree. (Total: $15
million)

[Vol. 65:427

$280.95
million

Consent
Decree, S.D.
Ind.

$15.85
million

Consent
Decree, S.D.
Ohio

209. Hoosier Energy Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. Settlement, EPA (July 23, 2010),
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/hoosier.html.
210. American Municipal Power Clean Air Act Settlement, EPA (May 18, 2010), http://
www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/americanmunicipalpower.html.
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Westar
Energy, Inc.
(2010)211

Duke Energy
Gallagher
Plant
(2009)212

“Westar Energy made
modifications at the
Jeffrey Energy Center
without first complying
with pre-construction
obligations, including
obtaining preconstruction permits and
installing and operating
state-of-the-art pollution
control technology, in
violation of The Clean
Air Act (CAA)
Prevention of Significant
Deterioration provisions,
42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7492
and the Kansas State
Implementation Plan
(SIP)[ and] Title V of the
CAA and the Kansas
Title V regulations.”
“Duke made illegal
modifications to
Gallagher Units 1 and 3
that caused significant
increases in sulfur
dioxide (SO2). The
company made these
modifications without
first complying with preconstruction obligations,
including obtaining preconstruction permits and
installing and operating
state-of-the-art pollution
control technology, in
violation of: The Clean
Air Act (CAA)
Nonattainment New
Source Review and
Prevention of Significant
Deterioration provisions,
42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7492,
7501-7515[, and] [t]he
Indiana State
Implementation Plan
(Indiana SIP).”

$3 million

$6 million in
mitigation
projects, plus $520
million to comply
with the injunction
(estimated $490
million to $550
million). (Total:
$526 million)

$529 million

Consent
Decree, D.
Kan., No. 09cv-2059

$93 million

$1.75 million

$6.25 million for
mitigation projects
and $85 million for
cost of complying
with injunctions.
(Total: $91.25
million)

Consent
Decree, S.D.
Ind., No.
1:99-cv01693

211. Westar Energy, Inc. Settlement, EPA (Jan 25, 2010), http://www.epa.gov/compli
ance/resources/cases/civil/caa/westarenergy.html.
212. Duke Energy Gallagher Plant Settlement, supra note 94.
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Kentucky
Utilities
Company
(2009)213

Salt River
Project
Agriculture
Improvement
and Power
District
(2008)214

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
“Kentucky Utilities
violated the Prevention
of Significant
Deterioration
requirements of the
[Clean Air] Act and the
Kentucky State
Implementation Plan
(SIP) by modifying and
subsequently operating
Brown Unit 3 without
obtaining a PSD permit
and without retrofitting
the unit with the Best
Achievable Control
Technology (BACT).” In
addition, “[t]he Unites
[sic] States alleges that
Kentucky Utilities
violated the NSPS by
modifying Brown Unit 3
and continuing to
operate this unit without
complying with NSPS
emission standards and
other requirements.”
“[V]iolated the Clean
Air Act by undertaking
construction activities
that constituted ‘major
modifications’ at
Coronado Generating
Station’s two coal-fired
electric generating units,
designated as Units 1
and 2, without first
undergoing PSD review,
obtaining required
permits, and installing
Best Available Control
Technology to reduce air
pollution. The United
States also alleges that
SRP failed to include the
PSD requirements in its
Title V operating permit
for the plant.”

$1.4 million

$950,000

$5.6 million for
civil mitigation
(midpoint of range
which includes
$1.8 million to $7
million + $1
million +
$200,000) and
$135 million to
install state-of-theart pollution
control technology
to satisfy the
injunction. (Total:
$140.6 million)

$4 million for
mitigation projects
and $400 million
for compliance
with the
injunction. (Total:
$404 million)

[Vol. 65:427

$142 million

Consent
Decree, E.D.
Ky., No. 5:07cv-0075

$404.95
million

Consent
Decree, D.
Ariz., No.
2:08-cv-1479

213. Kentucky Utilities Company Clean Air Act Settlement, EPA (Feb. 3, 2009), http://
www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/kucompany.html.
214. Salt River Project Agriculture Improvement and Power District Settlement, EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/srp.html (last visited Mar. 24,
2013).
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American
Electric
Power
Service
Corporation
(AEP)
(2007)215

East
Kentucky
Power
Cooperative
(EKPC)
(2007)216

Nevada
Power
Company
(2007)217

“AEP made physical and
operational changes at
nine of its plants that
constituted ‘major
modifications’ without
first undergoing PSD
review or Nonattainment New Source
Review (NNSR),
obtaining required
permits, and installing
and operating Best
Available Control
Technology and/or
technology reflecting the
Lowest Achievable
Emission Rate (LAER)
to reduce air pollution.”
“EKPC made physical
and operational changes
at the Spurlock Plant that
constituted ‘major
modifications’ without
first undergoing
Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD)
review, obtaining
required permits, and
installing and operating
Best Available Control
Technology to reduce air
pollution.”
“EPA alleges Nevada
Power violated the Clean
Air Act by undertaking
construction activities at
two combustion turbines,
designated as Units 5
and 6, that increased
pollution without first
applying for an NSR
Clean Air Act permit.
An NSR permit would
have required Nevada
Power to take steps to
reduce emissions at the
time of the activities.”

$15 million

AEP will “spend
$60 million on
projects to mitigate
the adverse effects
of its past excess
emissions” and
more than $4.6
billion to
implement the
injunction to
reduce pollutants.
(Total: $4.66
billion)

$750,000

The mitigatory
project is “valued
at $47 million for
installation of Wet
Electro-Static
Precipitators
designed to reduce
EKPC’s sulfuric
acid mist
emissions,” and
the cost of
reducing pollutants
to satisfy the
injunction is $603
million. (Total:
$650 million)

$300,000

$400,000 for
mitigation projects
and $60 million
cost of complying
with the
injunction. (Total:
$60.4 million)

$4.675 billion

Consent
Decree, S.D.
Ohio, No. C299-1250

$650.75
million

Consent
Decree, E.D.
Ky., No. 0434

$60.7 million

Consent
Decree, D.
Nev.

215. American Electric Power Service Corporation Information Sheet, supra note 124.
216. East Kentucky Power Cooperative Settlement, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/compli
ance/resources/cases/civil/caa/eastkentuckypower.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
217. Nevada Power Company Clean Air Act Settlement, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/nevadapower.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
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Alabama
Power
Company
(APC)
(2006)218

Minnkota
Power
Cooperative
and Square
Butte Electric
Cooperative
(2006).219

Illinois
Power
Company
and Dynegy
Midwest
Generation
(2005)220

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
“Based on information
received from the
company, EPA alleges
that at Plant Miller APC
violated the CAA by
commencing
construction activities
that increased pollution
at some units without
first applying for the
required permit. A
permit would have
required APC to take
steps to reduce emissions
at the time of the
construction activities.”
“EPA alleges Minnkota
violated the Clean Air
Act by undertaking
construction activities
that increased pollution
at some units without
first applying for an NSR
Clean Air Act permit.
An NSR permit would
have required Minnkota
to take steps to reduce
emissions at the time of
the activities.”
“Illinois Power
Company . . . violated
the New Source Review
provisions of the Clean
Air Act at the Baldwin
Power Station in
Baldwin, Illinois.”

$100,000

$4.9 million in
mitigation
projects; “APC
will [also] spend
approximately
$200 million
between now and
2012 to install
pollution controls
to substantially
decrease emissions
from Plant Miller
Units 3 and 4.”
(Total: $204.9
million)

$850,000

$5 million for
mitigation projects
and $100 million
to comply with the
injunction. (Total:
$105 million)

$9 million

$15 million in
mitigation
penalties and $500
million to comply
with the
injunction. (Total:
$515 million)

[Vol. 65:427

$205 million
Consent
Decree, N.D.
Ala., No.
2:01-cv00152

$105.85
million
Consent
Decree, D.
N.D.

$524 million
Consent
Decree, S.D.
Ill., No. 99833

218. Alabama Power Company Clean Air Settlement, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/compli
ance/resources/cases/civil/caa/alabamapower.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
219. Minnkota Power Cooperative and Square Butte Electric Cooperative, EPA, http://
www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/minnkota.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
220. Illinois Power Company and Dynegy Midwest Generation Settlement, EPA, http://
www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/illinoispower.html (last visited Mar. 24,
2013).
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Ohio Edison
Company,
W.H.
Sammis
Power
Station,
(2005)
(Modified in
2009)221

South
Carolina
Public
Service
Authority
(Santee
Cooper)
(2004)222

Southern
Indiana Gas
and Electric
Company
(SIGECO)
F.B. Culley
Plant
(2003)223

“Ohio Edison undertook
construction projects at
the Sammis Plant in
violation of the New
Source Review program.
In August 2003, the U.S.
District Court for the
Southern District of
Ohio affirmed all
allegations and found
that Ohio Edison failed
to obtain Clean Air Act
permits or to install
required pollution
controls.”
“EPA alleges Santee
Cooper violated the
Clean Air Act” New
Source Review program
at several of its plants
“by undertaking
construction activities
that increased pollution”
without installing
required pollution
controls.
The settlement is “to
resolve Clean Air Act
violations at SIGECO’s
F.B. Culley coal-fired
power plant (Culley
Station). . . . SIGECO
violated the Clean Air
Act by significantly
modifying its Culley
Station facility, and
increasing its pollution
output, without first
applying for a Clean Air
Act permit and taking
steps to reduce increased
emissions.”

$8.5 million

$25 million in
mitigation projects
and $1.1 billion to
comply with the
injunction. (Total:
$1.125 billion)

$2 million

$4.5 million in
mitigation projects
and $4 billion for
complying with
the injunction.
(Total: $4.0045
billion)

$600,000

$2.5 million for
mitigation projects
and $30 million to
comply with the
injunction. (Total:
$32.5 million)

$1.1335
billion
Consent
Decree, S.D.
Ohio, No.
2:99-cv-1181

$4.0065
billion

Consent
Decree, D.
S.C.

$33.1 million
Consent
Decree, S.D.
Ind., No.
IP99-1692-C

221. Ohio Edison Company, W.H. Sammis Power Station, Clean Air Act—2005
Settlement and 2009 Modified Settlement, EPA (Aug. 11, 2009), http://www.epa.gov/compli
ance/resources/cases/civil/caa/ohioedison.html.
222. South Carolina Public Service Authority (Santee Cooper), EPA, http://www.epa.
gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/santeecooper.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
223. Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company (SIGECO) F.B. Culley Plant Clean
Air Act Settlement, supra note 114.
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Alcoa, Inc.
(2003)224

Wisconsin
Electric
Power
Company
(WEPCO)
(2003)225

Virginia
Electric
Power
Company
(VEPCO)
(2003)226

PSEG Fossil
Inc. (2002)227

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
Alcoa unlawfully
operated the Rockdale
facility since it
overhauled the Rockdale
power plant without
installing necessary
pollution controls and
without first obtaining
proper permits required
by the New Source
Review program of the
Clean Air Act.
“Wisconsin Electric
violated the New Source
Review provisions of the
Clean Air Act at several
of its plants by
undertaking major
modifications and
increasing emissions of
air pollution without also
installing required air
pollution controls.”
EPA charged VEPCO
with having undertaken
major modifications at
their power plants
without installing
equipment required to
control pollution that
causes smog, acid rain
and soot.
Hudson and Mercer
plants are unlawfully
operating because they
were modified without
installing necessary
pollution controls and
obtaining proper permits
required by the New
Source Review program
of the Clean Air Act.

$1.5 million

$3.2 million

$2.5 million for
mitigation projects
and $330 million
to comply with the
injunction. (Total:
$332.5 million)

$20 million for
mitigation projects
and $600 million
to comply with the
injunction. (Total:
$620 million)

[Vol. 65:427

$334 million
Consent
Decree, W.D.
Tex., No. A01-CA-881

$623.2
million

Consent
Decree, E.D.
Wisc., No.
03-C-0371

$1.2192
billion

$5.3 million

$13.9 million for
mitigation and
$1.2 billion for
injunctive relief.
(Total: $1.2139
billion)

$346.25
million

$6 million

$3.25 million for
mitigation projects
and $337 million
for complying with
the injunction.
(Total: $340.25
million)

Consent
Decree, E.D.
Va.

Consent
Decree, D.
N.J., No. 02cv-340

224. Alcoa, Inc. Clean Air Act Settlement, supra note 71.
225. Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEPCO) Clean Air Act Civil Settlement, EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/wepco.html (last visited Mar. 24,
2013).
226. Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) Clean Air Act Settlement, EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/vepco.html (last visited Mar. 24,
2013).
227. PSEG Fossil L.L.C. Settlement, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/
cases/civil/caa/psegllc.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
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Tampa
Electric
Company
(TECO)
(2000)228

“[T]he government
charged that Tampa
Electric Company and
six other utilities
violated the law at their
power plants by making
major modifications to
the plants without
installing equipment
required to control smog,
acid rain and soot.”

$3.5 million

$10.5 million in
mitigation projects
(estimated $10 $11 million). No
estimate for
injunctive relief
was given in fact
sheet or consent.
(Total: $10.5
million)

$14.0 million

Consent
Decree, M.D.
Fla., No. 992524-T

228. Tampa Electric Company (TECO) Clean Air Act Settlement, EPA, http://www.epa.
gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/teco.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
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